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Abstract
In the field of multiagent systems, one important problem is fairly allocating items among a set of
agents. The gold standard fairness property is envy-freeness whereby each agent prefers the bundle
allocated to them over any other bundle. For indivisible goods, envy-freeness cannot be guaranteed:
consider two agents and one item. In the context of indivisible goods, one key fairness notion which
has gained significant attention in recent years is the maximin share guarantee (MMS). MMS extends
the cut-and-choose protocol to multiple agents by guaranteeing each agent as much value as if they
divided items into bundles but chose last. However, MMS is not guaranteed to exist, and even it exists,
computing an MMS allocation is computationally hard. Consequently, several approximation techniques
were proposed to ensure all agents receive a fraction of their MMS.
We propose an orthogonal approximation which aims to guarantee MMS for a fraction of the agents.
We construct instances where any optimal approximation algorithm fails to guarantee MMS for most
agents. We show how to interpolate between the fraction of agents and the fraction of MMS guaranteed
to agents. We prove the existence of allocations which satisfy 2
3
of the agents. Our algorithmic technique
immediately implies a polynomial-time algorithm for any number of items when there are less than nine
agents. Our results significantly reduce the existence gap of MMS when agents divide the items into 3n
2
bundles. We empirically demonstrate that our algorithm outperforms its worst-case bounds in practice
on both synthetic and real-world data.
We extend our discussion of maximin share approximations to chores. We extend many of the
techniques used for MMS approximations to the chores setting. Using these new techniques, we prove





Multiagent systems are ubiquitous in our day-to-day lives. From lines at the grocery store to voting for
representatives, nearly every action we take can be seen as the result of multiple people interacting. When
humans are not present, the interactions of computers and robots can be seen as a multiagent system. Even
within a single computer, the allocation of registers can be viewed as a multiagent system. Due to their
ubiquity, the study of multiagent systems has gained significant attention in recent years. Within the field of
multiagent sytems, one key property drives a significant fraction of research: fairness. Across the subfields
of voting, auction design, and item allocation, fairness is defined slightly differently, but the key idea is the
same; each agent wants to be treated the same as other agents. In voting, this might mean that each agent’s
vote counts equally, but it might also mean that agents who vote for a non-favorable candidate still receive
some influence after their candidate is removed from the election.
In the field of fair division, fairness is often easier to define. Each agent wants to receive a bundle
that they prefer to the bundle of others. This notion, known as envy-freeness, is the gold standard when
allocating items among agents. For divisible goods, an envy-free allocation always exists [Edward Su, 1999].
It remains an open question whether envy-free allocations can be found with only polynomially many queries
for agents’ valuations. In this setting, proportionality, a relaxation of envy-freeness, can be guaranteed in a
linear number of queries. In a proportional allocation, each agent receives 1n th of their total valuation for
the items. When items are indivisible, the problem becomes much harder. In the indivisible setting, neither
envy-free nor proportional allocations are guaranteed to exist. Consider a single good with two interested
agents. Since the good is indivisible, one of the agents will remain empty-handed.
In the context of indivisible items, multiple alternative notions of fairness have been proposed. One
criterion which has gained significant attention in recent years is the maximin share guarantee (MMS). In an
MMS allocation, each agent requires at least as much value as if they divided items into bundles and then
received the least valuable bundle of the division. Intuitively, each agent tries to divide items as evenly as
possible. When valuations are heavily skewed in favor of a few items, the MMS guarantee focuses more on
how the remaining items can be divided fairly. Despite the apparent benefits of MMS over proportionality,
it turns out that an MMS allocation does not always exist [Procaccia and Wang, 2014]. Even when it
exists, finding an MMS allocation is NP-Hard even for two agents with identical preferences [Bouveret and
Lemâıtre, 2016]. Consequently, recent research has focused on bounding the ratio of MMS that each agent
can be guaranteed simultaneously [Amanatidis et al., 2017, Aziz et al., 2017, Garg and Taki, 2020, Garg
et al., 2018, Ghodsi et al., 2018, Huang and Lu, 2019, Kurokawa et al., 2016]. In this research, we propose
an alternative notion of fairness based one the population of agents. The overall thesis of this project is:
In the allocation of indivisible resources (goods or chores) among multiple agents, fairness can
be guaranteed for a large subset of agents, and allocations can be computed efficiently when con-
sidering the majority of the participating agents.
Current techniques aim to provide all agents with a constant fraction of their MMS guarantee. This approach
may leave most agents without the resources they require to complete tasks. Thus instead of asking what
ratio of MMS each agent can be guaranteed, we ask what ratio of agents can be guaranteed their MMS
guarantee. While this may initially appear less fair, there are multiple real world scenarios where such a
guarantee is applicable. For example, doctors and nurses in a hospital require a complete set of resources
before any operation can be done. Thus it is more important that all necessary resources are available
for a subset of operations. The alternative where a subset of resources is available for each operation may
1
mean that few to none of the operations can be completed successfully, which may jeopardize patient health.
Similarly, course selection in colleges also necessitates this resource allocation constraint; senior level students
must be guaranteed seats in major specific classes in order to prevent graduation delays. Lower level students
may then be presented alternatives satisfying general education requirements if there is insufficient space in
their in-major classes.
The majority of fair division research focuses on the case that items are non-negatively valued by all
agents. In this context, the items are referred to as goods. However, when items are negatively valued,
referred to as chores or bads, many results do not immediately extend into this domain. We explore both
traditional and population-based approximations of MMS in both the goods and chores settings.
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• We propose a novel (α, β)-MMS fairness that considers the population of agents. Here we show that
optimizing classical approximations might perform arbitrarily poor with respect to our new fairness
notion.1 We prove the existence of (23 , 1)-MMS allocations, and our proof is algorithmic for n < 9.
Empirically, we demonstrate that our algorithm extends beyond its theoretical bounds and computes
( 23 , 1)-MMS allocations on a mixture of synthetic and real-world data where n ≥ 9.
• Using the above result, we improve the existence gap for MMSk from k ≤ 2n − 2 to k ≤ d 3n2 e. This
tightens the open upper-bound towards the current lower-bound of k ≥ n+ 1.
• We extend the existing framework for maximin share approximations in the chores settings. In contrast
to goods, we show that a 23 approximation based on the population of agents can easily be computed
in polynomial time.
The detailed proofs and missing discussions can be found in the appendix.
1This result has already appeared in AAAI 2020 [Searns and Hosseini, 2020].
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2 Preliminaries
A fair division instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 consists of a set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}2, a set of m indivisible
items M , and a valuation profile V . Each agent is endowed with a valuation function vi : 2
M → R. We
assume that valuations are additive: for any set of items S ⊆ M , vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}). For simplicity, we
write vi(g) in place of vi({g}).
We say that an instance is a goods instance if each agent has non-negative value for all items. Con-
versely, we say that an instance is a chores instance if each agent has negative value for all items. Any
instance which is neither a goods instance nor a chores instance is a mixed instance.
An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is an n-partition of M (where Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ N and
∪i∈NAi = M) where each agent i receives the corresponding bundle Ai. A partial allocation is an allocation
of a subset of M ′ ⊆M of the goods. Let Πk(M) denote the set of k-partitions of M .
2.1 Fairness Notions
The most desirable fairness notion is that of envy-freeness (proposed by Foley [1967]) whereby each agent
weakly prefers the bundle allocated to them over any other bundle (see Figure 1). However, this notion
cannot be guaranteed for indivisible goods. The simplest relaxation of envy-freeness adds an “up to one”
condition that allows agents to overlook a single item’s worth of value. Formally, the envy-free up to one
good (EF1) notion is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Budish [2011]). An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M) is envy-free up to one good
(EF1) if for each pair of agents i, j ∈ N , at least one of the following holds:
• vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)
• ∃g ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g})
• ∃b ∈ Ai such that vi(Ai \ {b}) ≥ vi(Aj).
While EF1 is often desirable, it sometimes allows unnecessarily skewed valuations. For example, consider
two agents with three markers and a car on the market. The allocation which gives a car and a marker to
one agent and the remaining two markers to the other agent is EF1 (removing the car eliminates the envy).
However, a fairer solution would be to separate the car from all three markers. One notion which addresses
this issue is envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). When agents compare bundles in an EFX bundle, they
must be envy-free up to the least valuable good in the other agent’s bundle. For example, this means that
the agent with two markers would not be envy-free after removing the marker from the other agent’s bundle.
Definition 2 (Caragiannis et al. [2016]). An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M) is envy-free up to
any good (EFX) if for each pair of agents i, j ∈ N , at least one of the following holds:
• vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)
• ∀g ∈ Aj such that vi(g) > 0, vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g})
• ∀b ∈ Ai such that vi(b) < 0, vi(Ai \ {b}) ≥ vi(Aj).
While EFX is very close to envy-freeness, it is only known to exist for three agents [Chaudhury et al.,
2020].
Another relaxation of envy-freeness is known as proportionality (See Figure 2). Perhaps the most simple
fairness notion, proportionality requires that each agent receives at least a proportional amount of their value
for all items.
2For simplicity, we sometimes write [k] to denote the set of integers [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}.
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Agent g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
1 6 2 5 10 1
2 1 4 12 3 6
3 7 3 8 9 2
Figure 1: The circled allocation is EF1 but not EFX as good g4 can be removed from agent 3’s bundle to
eliminate agent 1’s envy, but not good g5. as each agent prefers the bundle allocated to them over each other
allocated bundle.
Definition 3 (Steinhaus [1949]). An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M) is proportional (Prop) if for
each agent i ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≥ vi(M)n .
Agent g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 Total Propi
1 3 5 9 1 6 24 8
2 2 6 1 8 7 24 8
3 10 8 5 3 1 27 9
Figure 2: The circled allocation is Prop as each agent receives at least vi(M)n .
Unfortunately, like envy-freeness proportionality cannot be guaranteed when items are indivisible: con-
sider two agents and a single desirable item. The maximin share notion was introduced to help deal with
this issue in proportionality (See Figure 3). When item valuations are heavily skewed, the maximin share
guarantee lets agents request as close to a proportional allocation as possible.
Definition 4 (Budish [2011]). The k maximin share guarantee of agent i ∈ N is the maximum amount
of value that agent i can guarantee for themself by dividing items into k bundles and then selecting their least
valuable bundle. Formally,





When M , vi, or k are clear from context, we may omit them and write MMSi to mean MMS
k
i (M,vi).
Agent g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
1 3 5 9 1 6
1 3 5 9 1 6
1 3 5 9 1 6
(a) The MMS3 partition for agent 1: MMS31 = 7.
Agent g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 MMSi
1 3 5 9 1 6 7
2 2 6 1 8 7 8
3 10 8 5 3 1 8
(b) An MMS allocation.
Figure 3: The MMS guarantee requires two parts: computing each agent’s MMS values and finding an
allocation which guarantees each agent that value.
While MMS exists with high probability in random instances [Dickerson et al., 2014], it is both not
guaranteed to exist [Procaccia and Wang, 2014] and NP-hard to compute even when it exists [Bouveret
and Lemâıtre, 2016]. Consequently, recent studies in maximin share fairness aim to approximate the MMS
guarantee. The most common relaxation is to ensure that each agent receives at least a β fraction of their
maximin share. This idea was pushed to its limits by Heinen et al. [2018] with the notion of optimal-MMS.
Given an instance, an optimal-MMS allocation is any allocation which maximizes the minimum ratio any
4
agent receives of their MMS (See Figure 4). Since the number of allocations is finite, an optimal-MMS
allocation is guaranteed to exist.
Definition 5 (Heinen et al. [2018]). Given an instance, the optimal-MMS ratio is the best possible approx-
imation of MMS that can be achieved by all agents simultaneously. For a goods instance, the optimal-MMS








Likewise, for a chores instance, the optimal-MMS ratio is the minimal ratio that can be satisfied simultane-








An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) satisfies optimal-MMS if each agent receives at least a λ
∗ fraction of their
MMS guarantee: for all i ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≥ λ∗MMSni .
Agent g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 MMSi
1 3 5 9 1 6 7
2 2 6 1 8 7 8
3 10 8 5 3 1 8
Figure 4: The circled allocation maximizes the minimum ratio vi(Ai)MMSi and thus satisfies optimal-MMS.
2.2 Population Based Fairness
In this research, we propose an orthogonal direction of maximin share approximations. We wish to approxi-
mate fairness by maximizing the number of satisfied agents. We present a notion of (α, β)-MMS wherein an
α fraction of agents require a β ratio of their MMS (See Figure 5).
Definition 6. An allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M) satisfies (α, β)-MMS if there exists a subset
N ′ ⊆ N such that |N ′| ≥ bα|N |c and for all i ∈ N ′, vi(Ai) ≥ βMMSni . We say that (α, β)-MMS exists if for
every N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| ≤ bα|N |c, there exists an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . An) ∈ Πn(M) such that for all
i ∈ N ′, vi(Ai) ≥ βMMSni .
We note that the definition of (α, β)-MMS existing is equivalent if the inequality is replaced with equality.
Any subset N ′ with size |N ′| < bα|N |c is a subset of another set N ′′ ⊃ N ′ such that N ′′ ⊆ N with
|N ′′| = bα|N |c. Any allocation that gives each agent in N ′′ a β fraction of their MMS must also give each
agent in N ′ a β fraction of their MMS. Thus that allocation may be reused to satisfy the subset N ′.
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 MMSi
1 3 5 9 1 6 7
2 2 6 1 8 7 8
3 10 8 5 3 1 8











While fairness is the primary objective in this research, an important tangential concern is that of economic
efficiency. Fairness notions such as envy-freeness can be trivially satisfied by giving all agents nothing.
However, this trivial allocation wastes significant value that could otherwise be given to agents. Economic
efficiency describes the notion that there is no unnecessarily wasted value. The most common efficiency
measure is that of Pareto optimality (PO).
Definition 7. Given two allocations A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) and B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) A,B ∈ Πn(M), we
say that A Pareto dominates B if for all i ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Bi) with at least one of these inequalities
strict. An allocation is Pareto optimal if there is no allocation which Pareto dominates it.
When we consider threshold based fairness measures (like proportionality or maximin share), we often
ignore economic efficiency because empty allocations do not satisfy non-trivial thresholds. However, if an
allocation exists which satisfies the threshold fairness criteria, then by repeatedly following Pareto improve-
ments (the set of allocations is finite, so this process will terminate), we will eventually find an allocation
which satisfies the threshold fairness and which is also Pareto optimal. However, finding Pareto improve-
ments is an NP-Hard problem when valuations are additive [Aziz et al., 2019], and thus finding allocations
which simultaneously satisfy fairness and efficiency is an important extension of any fairness research.
Agent g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
1 3 5 9 1 6
2 2 6 1 8 7
3 10 8 5 3 1
Figure 6: The squared allocation is Pareto dominated by the circled allocation. The circled allocation,








(Bouveret and Lemâıtre [2016])
n = 3
7
Kurokawa et al. [2018]
7/8 approximation Amanatidis et al. [2017]
n ≥ 4 7
Kurokawa et al. [2018]





(Bouveret and Lemâıtre [2016])
Binary
3
Bouveret and Lemâıtre [2016]
Round Robin
(Bouveret and Lemâıtre [2016])
{0, 1, 2} 3
Amanatidis et al. [2017]
polynomial time
(Amanatidis et al. [2017])
Table 1: A summary of MMS results for Goods
Results for Goods. The maximin share guarantee was first proposed by Budish [2011]. When it was first
proposed, it was conjectured that an MMS allocation always exists. This idea was supported by Dickerson
et al. [2014] who proved that MMS exists with high probability whenever the number of goods exceeded the
number of agents by at least a logarithmic factor. This conjecture was falsified by Procaccia and Wang [2014]
with a construction which used exponentially many goods. The MMS counter-example was later generalized
to n agents and reduced to only 3n+ 4 goods [Kurokawa et al., 2016, 2018].
The complexity of deciding whether or not MMS exists for a given instance was studied by Bouveret and
Lemâıtre [2016]. They gave a simple algorithm to show that MMS existence can be decided in ΣP2 ; however,
this is not tight to their NP-hard lower bound. It remains an open question whether MMS existence can
be decided in NP. Determining whether an MMS allocation exists appears to be based around two related
questions: determining MMS values and checking whether a given allocation satisfies MMS. The former
question is NP-complete but it admits a PTAS4 to approximate MMS values [Woeginger, 1997], and the
latter is known to be in coNP where a negative certificate demonstrates an MMS partition for some agent
who did not receive their MMS.
In the special case that goods are valued either {0, 1} the round robin algorithm computes an MMS
allocation in polynomial time [Bouveret and Lemâıtre, 2016]. This result was extended to valuations from
{0, 1, 2} using a more intricate polynomial time algorithm [Amanatidis et al., 2017]. If there are only two
agents, an MMS allocation exists using the cut-and-choose protocol [Bouveret and Lemâıtre, 2016]. Likewise,
when all agents have identical preferences, any MMS partition is also an MMS allocation by definition.5
Table 1 summarizes the existing MMS results for goods instances.
For more general instances, each agent can be guaranteed a bundle worth at least 23 of their MMS
using relatively simple algorithms [Amanatidis et al., 2017, Garg et al., 2018, Kurokawa et al., 2016]. With
more intricate algorithms, this result was extended to a 34 − ε approximation by Ghodsi et al. [2018] and
4See Appendix A for a discussion on PTAS algorithms.
5This result extends to the case where all but one agents have identical preferences. Any agent with identical preferences
divides the items into bundles according to their MMS partition, then the one differing agent selects a bundle first. Since at
least one bundle has value at least the average, this agent will be able to select a bundle worth at least their MMS value.
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a 34 approximation by Garg and Taki [2020]. And in the case of three agents, this approximation can be
extended to 78 [Amanatidis et al., 2017]. Another recent direction of research is to focus on the maximum
approximation of MMS possible given an instance. Given an instance, the optimal-MMS notion guarantees
each agent the maximum possible ratio of their MMS which can be satisfied simultaneously. This notion of
optimal-MMS always exists because the number of allocations is finite; the approximation ratio is guaranteed
to be at least 1 if an MMS allocation exists. Heinen et al. [2018] presented a PTAS algorithm for computing
an approximately optimal-MMS allocation.
The closest idea to approximating MMS with respect to the population is the l-out-of-d MMS notion
presented by Babaioff et al. [2019]. This notion guarantees each agent at least as much value as if they
divided items into d bundles and then selected the last l of them. Under this notion, it is known that
a 1-out-of-(2n − 2) MMS allocation always exists Aigner-Horev and Segal-Halevi [2019]. In the l-out-of-d
setting, Segal-Halevi [2019] demonstrated a dominance relationship and characterized sufficient conditions
for the l-out-of-d maximin guarantee to be larger than an l′-out-of-d′ maximin guarantee.
Our setting is only concerned with agent’s valuations for the bundles allocated to them. A tangential
setting views this allocation as a market equilibrium. In that setting, agents are given equal budgets and
any allocation also requires a set of prices for which all agents can afford to buy the bundles allocated to
them. The market clearing equilibrium is one where every item is bought and no agent has excess budget.
In this setting, Budish [2011] proved that 1-out-of-(n+1) MMS can be guaranteed with approximate market
clearing. However, in our setting, excess demand in the approximate market clearing translates to over-
allocation of some goods. This might mean that some goods are allocated to multiple agents despite there
only being one copy of it. Thus the 1-out-of-n+ 1 allocation may not be feasible in our setting.
Results for Chores. Aziz et al. [2017] extended many of the initial results for goods to the context of
chores. They proved that MMS does not exist in general in the chores setting by adapting the MMS coun-
terexample for three agents. They also extended the NP-hardness result for computing an MMS allocation
to the setting of chores. Using a simple greedy algorithm, they provided a 2-approximation of both MMS and
the analogous definition of optimal-MMS.6 Furthermore, when the number of agents is fixed, they provide
a (1 + ε) PTAS for optimal-MMS. This paper also proved a relationship between the MMS guarantee for
chores with the minimax share guarantee for goods.
In polynomial time, it is possible to give each agent a 43 -approximation of MMS using algorithms similar
to the 23 -approximation for goods [Amanatidis et al., 2017]. Huang and Lu [2019] proved that an
11
9 -
approximation always exists, and using the PTAS for MMS values from Woeginger [1997], they provide a
polynomial time algorithm to compute an ( 119 + ε)MMS
n allocation. Table 2 shows the strongest known
bounds for various approximations of MMS.
6In the context of chores, MMS approximations are flipped. It is better to receive a smaller approximation (closer to 1).
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Problem Goods Chores
MMS 7 Procaccia and Wang [2014] 7 Aziz et al. [2017]
(1, β)-MMS β = 34 Garg and Taki [2020] β =
11
9 Huang and Lu [2019]
MMSγn
γ = 2n−2n Aigner-Horev and Segal-Halevi [2019]
γ = 32 Corollary 2
γ = 23 Theorem 6
(α, 1)-MMS α = 23 Theorem 3 α =
n−1
n Observation 1
Table 2: Approximation Results for Goods and Chores
4 Maximin Share Guarantee for Goods
In this section we discuss various approximations of the maximin share guarantee for goods instances. In
Section 4.1, we first prove common techniques for computing MMS approximations. We then explore the
trade-offs inherent to MMS approximations in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we explore (α, β)-MMS for small
values of n. When n is large, we provide a simple algorithm for ( 12 , 1)-MMS in Section 4.4. With significantly
more intricate analysis, we prove that ( 23 , 1)-MMS exists in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we consider the
relationships between different MMS approximations. Our proof of ( 23 , 1)-MMS existence is algorithmic for
n < 9, but we empirically demonstrate that it effectively extends to more agents in Section 4.7.
4.1 Warmup: Standard Lemmas
Prop Bound. In the study of maximin share approximations, most algorithms leverage a few simple
lemmas. The first such lemma relates the maximin share to the proportional fair share.
Lemma 1. For each agent i ∈ N , MMSki (M) ≤
vi(M)
k .
Proof. Suppose this is not the case. Consider an MMS partition (M1, . . . ,Mk) ∈ Πk(M) for agent i. Since
each bundle in an MMS partition is worth at least the MMS value, there are k bundles with value at least
MMSki (M) >
vi(M)
k . Adding these bundles implies that vi(M) = kMMS
k
i (M) > k
vi(M)
k = vi(M).
Scale Invariance. The next lemma shows that we can rescale agents’ valuations as MMS allocations are
scale invariant. This lemma was originally presented by Ghodsi et al. [2018].
Lemma 2 (Ghodsi et al. [2018]). Let I = 〈N,M, V 〉 be an instance and c > 0 be a real scalar. Let
I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉 be constructed so that v′i(g) = cvi(g) for all g ∈M . Then MMS
′k
i (M) = cMMS
k
i (M).







g∈S cvi(g) = c
∑
g ∈ Svi(g) = cvi(S). Since this is true for every bundle S ⊆ M , it is also true
of each bundle of any partition. Thus all bundles, and therefore the lowest value bundle of a parti-





i(Aj) = cmax(A1,...,Ak)∈Πk(M) minj∈[k] vi(Aj) = cMMS
k
i (M,vi). Furthermore,




i) and it also satisfies
MMS on I ′.
We define the function Scale(I, k) which takes an input instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 and a positive real
value k and outputs a new instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V 〉 where for all agents i ∈ N , v′i(M) = k. This is easily
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Algorithm 4.1: Ordering an Instance
Input : Instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 on n agents
Output: An Ordered instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉
1 for j = 1 to m do
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 Let g = agent i’s jth most valuable
item;
4 v′i(gj) = vi(g);
Algorithm 4.2: Unordering an Allocation
Input : Allocation A′ = (A′1, . . . , A
′
n) for an
ordered instance I ′ of I
Output: Allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) for the
unordered instance I
1 A = (∅, . . . , ∅) and M ′ = M ;
2 for j = 1 to m do
3 Let agent i be the agent who received gj in
A′i;
4 Let g = arg maxg∈M′ vi(g);
5 Ai = Ai ∪ {g} and M ′ = M ′ \ {g};
Figure 7: Algorithms for ordering an instance and unordering an allocation.

















Ordering. Bouveret and Lemâıtre [2016] proved that the most difficult instances for fair division are those
where agents agree on the ordinal preferences over the items.
Definition 8. An instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 is ordered if there exists an ordering (g1, . . . , gm) such that for
all i ∈ N , vi(g1) ≥ vi(g2) ≥ . . . ≥ vi(gm).
Using Algorithm 4.1, Bouveret and Lemâıtre [2016] showed that any instance can be converted into
a related ordered instance in polynomial time. Furthermore, using Algorithm 4.2, any allocation for the
ordered instance can be converted into an allocation for the original instance where each agent receives at
least as much value.
Lemma 3 (Bouveret and Lemâıtre [2016]). Let I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉 be an ordered instance constructed from
the original instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉. Given allocation A′ on I ′, a corresponding allocation A on I can be
computed in polynomial time such that for all i ∈ N, vi(Ai) ≥ v′i(A′i).
Proof. Algorithm 4.2 allocates a single item at each iteration of the for loop. On iteration k, there have been
k− 1 item allocated. Thus among the top k item of agent i, at least one such item still remains. Thus agent
i will take an item worth at least vi(gk). Each item allocated in the unordered allocation is worth at least
as much as the corresponding item allocated in the ordered allocation. By additivity, the resulting bundles
in the unordered allocation are worth at least as much as the bundles of the ordered allocation.
Reductions. The next important lemma (originally presented by [Amanatidis et al., 2017]) shows that
removing a single good and any agent results in a new instance where the remaining agents MMS values
are at least as large. Thus if any good has value at least vi(M)n to any agent, we may give that good to the
interested agent and approximate MMS in the reduced instance.
Lemma 4 (Amanatidis et al. [2017]). For all i ∈ N and g ∈M , MMSn−1i (M \ {g}) ≥ MMS
n
i (M).
Proof. Consider an MMS partition (M1, . . . ,Mk) ∈ Πn(M) for agent i. Suppose without loss of generality
that g ∈Mn. By redistributing the items Mn \ {g} and only selecting the bundles M ′1 to M ′n−1 we see that











MMSn−1j (M \ {gn, gn+1})
Figure 8: Visual proof of the {gn, gn+1} reduction.
This idea introduced the notion of reductions - we remove one agent and a set of goods and solve the
problem on the new instance. As long as other agents’ MMS values haven’t decreased, any guarantee achieved
in the reduced instance is also attained in the original instance. This idea was defined by Ghodsi et al. [2018]
as follows.
Definition 9. The act of removing a set Ai ⊆ M of items and an agent i is a valid reduction if the two
following conditions hold:
(i) vi(Ai) ≥ βMMSni (M)
(ii) ∀j ∈ N \ {i},MMSn−1j (M \Ai) ≥ MMS
n
j (M).
The following family of reductions generalize Lemma 4. The idea of the proof is demonstrated in Figure 8
for k = 1.
Lemma 5. Let I = 〈N,M, V 〉 be an ordered instance. For each 0 ≤ k < mn , let Sk = {gkn−k+1, . . . , gkn+1}.
If vi(Sk) ≥ βMMSni , then giving agent i the bundle Sk forms a valid reduction.
Proof. By the pigeonhole principle, of the first kn+ 1 goods, at least k + 1 of them must fall into the same
bundle of any MMSnj (M) partition, say bundle Ar. For each good g ∈ Sk that is not in Ar, it must be in
some other bundle, say As. Since Ar contains k+1 of the first kn+1 goods, and it doesn’t contain g, it must
contain some other good ĝ of the first kn+ 1 goods. We swap g and ĝ from bundles As and Ar respectively.
We know that vj(g) ≤ vj(ĝ) because Sk contains the last k + 1 goods of the first kn + 1 and the instance
is ordered. Thus after swapping vj(A
′
s) = vj(As) + vj(ĝ)− vj(g) ≥ vj(As). By continuing these swaps and
then redistributing any remaining goods of Ar \Sk, the resulting partition satisfies vj(A′t) ≥ vj(At) for each
t 6= r. Thus after removing bundles Ar = Sk and agent i, agent j forms an MMSn−1j (M \Ar) partition where
the minimum value bundle is at least as valuable as MMSnj (M). Thus MMS
n−1
j (M \Ar) ≥ MMS
n
j (M) and
giving agent i the set Ar forms a valid reduction.
Some important results that come out of Lemma 5 are that {g1} and {gn, gn+1} both form valid reductions
if any agent desires them. By repeatedly applying these reductions, we may assume that in a reduced instance
no agent desires any of these bundles more than their MMS. This implies that no good is worth more than
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the MMS and that there are at most n goods worth 12 of the MMS. (This holds because the instance is
ordered so vi(gn+1) ≤ vi(gn) for all i ∈ N .)
Beyond upper-bounding the value of goods, reductions also allow us to provide lower bounds on the
number of goods.
Lemma 6. In an ordered goods instance, if m < 2n or if vi(g2n) = 0, then giving agent i the good g1 forms
a valid reduction.
Proof. Suppose that agent i believes that there are less than 2n goods. Consider any partition A =
(A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M). A must include at least one bundle which contains a single item, say item gk.
If g1 is not in a bundle on its own, suppose that g1 is in a bundle with gj . If vi({gk, gj}) ≤ vi(g1) then
observe vi({gk, gj}) ≥ vi(gk). Otherwise if vi({gk, gj}) > vi(g1) then we still have vi(g1) ≥ vi(gk) because
the instance is ordered. This implies that min(vi(g1), vi({gk, gj})) ≥ min(vi(gk), vi({g1, gj})). Thus we may
swap goods g1 and gk to form a new partition whose minimum valued bundle is at least as large, and this
partition has g1 in its own bundle. Since this holds for every partition, it must necessarily be the case that
a maximin partition for agent i has g1 in its own bundle. This implies that vi(g1) ≥ MMSni . By Lemma 4,
we know that allocating g1 to agent i forms a valid reduction.
Lemma 6 shows that as long as m < 2n, we may repeatedly allocate the most valuable good remaining
to any agent arbitrarily. Eventually we will either allocate a single good to all agents (if m ≤ n at the start)
or we will arrive at a smaller instance for which the new m′ = 2n′.
In the (α, β)-MMS setting, it is important to observe that finding (α, β)-MMS allocations on reduced
instances is sufficient for finding (α, β)-MMS allocations on general instances. Whenever α ≤ 1, α(n−k)+k =
αn − αk + k = αn + (1 − α)k ≥ αn. Thus if k agents are allocated bundles during reductions, then an
(α, β)-MMS allocation on the reduced instance also gives an (α, β)-MMS allocation on the original instance.
Bag-Filling. Perhaps the most simple algorithm for maximin share approximations is bag-filling. The
concept of bag-filling is based upon the idea of the moving knife algorithm for divisible goods [Dubins and
Spanier, 1961]. In the moving knife algorithm, we move a knife from left to right along a cake until some
agent believes that the cut left of the knife is worth their proportional fair share. Since no other agent
shouted before the first agent shouts, the section of the cake taken by any agent is worth at most vi(M)n to
any other agent. This process repeats until all agents have taken a slice.
When we switch to indivisible goods, the corresponding algorithm is called bag-filling. In the bag-filling
algorithm, items are added to a bag until some agent says the bag is satisfactory. If the value of each good
is bounded above, we can bound the total value of each allocated bag accordingly.
Lemma 7. Suppose that vi(g) ≤ δ for each i ∈ N and g ∈ M . Then if agents shout for a bundle when it
has value ∆, the total value of each allocated bundle is at most δ + ∆ to each other agent.
Proof. Consider the last good added to a bag. The bag had value less than ∆ to all agents before this good
was added (as no agent had shouted previously). The last good has value at most δ, so after the last good
is added, the total value of the bundle is at most δ + ∆.
In the classical β-approximation of MMS, bag-filling gives a simple algorithm for (1, 23 )-MMS. This proof
was first presented by Garg et al. [2018].
Proposition 1 (Garg et al. [2018]). (1, 23 )-MMS exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
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Algorithm 4.3: Bag-filling for Goods
Input : An ordered goods instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, a threshold ∆
Output: An allocation A
1 Let M ′ = M , N ′ = N , and A = (∅, . . . , ∅);
2 for k = 1 to n do
3 B = ∅;
4 for j = 1 to |M ′| do
5 if ∃i ∈ N ′, vi(B ∪ gj) ≥ ∆ then
6 B = B ∪ gj ;
7 M ′ = M ′ \B;
8 Let i ∈ N ′ be an agent such that vi(B) ≥ ∆;
9 Ai = B and N
′ = N ′ \ i;
10 return A;
Proof. We claim that Algorithm 4.4 computes a (1, 23 )-MMS allocation. We first order and scale the instance




n = 1 (Lemma 14, and by repeatedly
applying the reductions from Lemma 5 for k = 0 and k = 1, we may assume that there are no goods worth






3 or more. If we
initialize A1 to An′ to contain the goods g1 to gn respectively, the remaining items all have value less than
1
3 . By running Algorithm 4.3 with ∆ =
2
3 , Lemma 7 implies that each bundle is allocated with total value
at most 13 +
2
3 = 1. Thus after n − 1 such bundles are allocated, there is still vi(M) − (n − 1) = 1 value
remaining, and the last agent may take a bundle worth at least 23MMS
n
i . Unordering the resulting allocation
gives all agents a bundle worth at least as much as in the ordered instance (Lemma 3), so all agents receive





Algorithm 4.4: Computing (1, 23 )-MMS
Input : An instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉
Output: A (1, 23 )-MMS allocation A
1 I ′ = Order(I); // Algorithm 4.1
2 I ′ = Scale(I ′, n); // Lemma 2
3 while ∃i ∈ N,S ∈ ({g1}, {gn, gn+1}), vi(S) ≥ 23 do
4 Allocate S to i;
5 N ′ = N ′ \ {i}, and M ′ = M ′ \ S;
6 I ′ =Scale(I ′, n′);
7 Initialize bags A1 to An′ with goods g1 to gn′ ;
8 A′ = Bag-fill(I ′, 23); // Algorithm 4.3
9 A = Unorder (A′, I); // Algorithm 4.2
The normalization steps on lines 1-6 and the unorder step at the end of Algorithm 4.4 are standard
techniques for computing approximate MMS allocations. While some results require different scaling or
reductions, the remaining structure is identical. We first order the instance, scale valuations to make MMS
bounds convenient, and apply a set of necessary reductions. After this, the resulting reduced instances have
some useful normalized form for which we may a more complicated algorithm. We then unorder the resulting
allocation yielding an allocation for the original instance which satisfies (α, β)-MMS as long as the allocation













(9b) The slices of tensor S. (9c) The shape of tensors S and
T .
Figure 9: The shape and slices of order 3 tensors with dimensions (6× 6× 6).
4.2 Optimal-MMS: Understanding the Trade-offs
An optimal-MMS allocation always exists; however, for instances where MMS allocations do not exist, such
allocations may leave many agents unsatisfied. In fact, we prove that there exists a family of instances where
any optimal-MMS allocation only gives a small constant number of agents their MMS guarantee. Therefore,
any optimal-MMS algorithm (e.g. Nguyen et al. [2017]) can perform arbitrarily poorly with respect to
satisfying MMS guarantees for a population of agents.
Theorem 1. For every n ≥ 4, there exists an instance with O(n2) goods where every optimal-MMS allocation
guarantees at most 3 (4 if n is odd) agents their MMS value.
The proof is by a construction inspired by those proposed by Kurokawa et al. [2016], but it includes a
few intricate modifications. We illustrate our construction for the smallest non-trivial instance: when n = 6.
The full proof of the theorem can be found in the Appendix B.
Our construction is broken into three components: a tensor S, a tensor T , and 3 groups of agents. The
tensors are used to create highly structured preferences for agents. The entries of tensor S are chosen such
that equi-partitions of the entries correspond to a set of slices of S. An equi-partition is a partition of
the entries of a tensor where each set of the partition has the same sum. Here, all equi-partitions refer to
n-partitions. Tensor T provides perturbation so that the only equi-partitions of S + T are aligned slices.
All tensors in our construction are order 3 with dimensions (6× 6× 6).7 We say that tensor S is indexed
by a 3-tuple (x1, x2, x3) corresponding to entry S[x1, x2, x3] or Sx1x2x3 for short. The 2-order slices of tensor
S along dimension j are given by Sj(1) to Sj(n) where Sj(i) = {Sx1x2x3 | xj = i}. We also define Si;xj=k to
be the entry where all indices are i except index xj = k. For example, Si;x1=n = Snii...i. Tensor addition is
entry-wise ((S + T )x1,x2,...,xd = Sx1,x2,...,xd + Tx1,x2,...,xd). Unless otherwise specified, the entries of a tensor
have value 0.
Figure 9 illustrates the shape of a tensor, describes slices of the tensor, and depicts the indexing of the
non-zero entries of S and T when there are 6 agents and d = 3.
Tensor S. Figure 10 shows the values of tensor S in our construction. The entries 242243 ,
80
81 , . . . ,
365
486 make
up the main diagonal (seen in blue on Figure 9c). The first thing to observe is that each slice has total sum
1; this includes the frontal, horizontal, and depth-wise slices. We next observe that the entries on the main
diagonal each have value greater than 12 , so any equi-partition of the non-zero entries of S must separate
these entries. Furthermore, observe that each entry off the main diagonal gets progressively larger. Thus
7When referring to a tensor, the “order” is the number of dimensions that the tensor is embedded in. The “dimensions” of
a tensor, however, refers to the number of entries along each axis, similar to the dimensions of a matrix.
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the only entries that can be allocated with S111 are those with value
1
486 or else there will not be sufficient
value for a later set. Starting from the first slice, we see that exactly two entries with these smaller values
in the same slice must be allocated in the same set of any equi-partition of S.
While a set of aligned slices forms an equi-partition, it is not necessarily the case that an equi-partition of
S must contain only aligned slices. Consider the set of slices {S1(1), S2(2), S3(3), S1(4), S2(5), S3(6)}. These











































Figure 10: The values of S where each section of the table corresponds to the slices S3(1) to S3(6) from left to right.
Empty cells indicate 0. The entries in the first row of the table are S111 and S611. The second entry in the first
column is entry S161.
Tensor T . Figure 11 shows the values of tensor T in our construction. Observe that each entry in T has
value proportional to εk for k ≥ 1. The largest entry of T is the entry with value z which is approximately
ε. We note that while T has negative entries, these values occur where S is positive. Thus if ε is sufficiently
small, all entries of S + T are non-negative. The entries of T are carefully crafted so that every slice has
sum 0. There are three entries (ui, vi, wi) adjacent to each entry on the main diagonal. Any slice Sj(i) will
only contain two of these three entries, and the remaining entry will be in the next slice Sj(i + 1). The
recursive definitions of ui, vi, and wi are chosen with specific cancellations in mind. To illustrate, consider
u2 + v2 = r2 +
u1−v1−w1
2 + c2 +
−u1+v1−w1
2 = r2 + c2 − w1. These cancellations occur on each slice so that
Tj(i) = 0 for each i, j.
We now consider the tensor S+T . Since the values of T are all less than ε in magnitude, the values of S
dominate any partition. Consider the first entry S111. Since two entries from {S116, S161, S611} must be put
with S111 to form an equi-partition of S, the two chosen entries will uniquely identify a slice (S + T )j(1).
Since these entries of S correspond to entries where T has values −r1, −c1, and −d1 respectively, the two
corresponding entries of u1, v1, and w1 must be chosen to make this set have total value of 1. Whichever
entry is not chosen is left for the next slice. As noted, this small perturbation in the next slice will uniquely
select a set which has value 1. Carrying this argument forward yields that the only equi-partitions of S + T
are those which correspond to aligned slices.
Grouping Agents. We now group our 6 agents into 3 groups of 2 agents each. For each group, we will
enforce that they have a unique set of slices which corresponds to an equi-partition. This is accomplished




























15−3i ci = ε
14−3i di = ε
13−3i
u1 = r1 v1 = c1 w1 = d1
ui = ri +
ui−1 − vi−1 − wi−1
2
vi = ci +
−ui−1 + vi−1 − wi−1
2
wi = di +
−ui−1 − vi−1 + wi−1
2
x =
u4 − v4 − w4
2
y =
−u4 + v4 − w4
2
z =
−u4 − v4 + w4
2
a = −d1 − d2 − d3 − d4 − z
Figure 11: The values of T . Empty cells indicate 0. The key point to note is that each slice T3(i) contains the value







Figure 12: The perturbation matrix (E) that separates groups P , Q, and R. An empty cell represents 0.
Consider group 1 where we add E to (S + T )1(6). Since the total sum of entries in E is 0, group 1 still has
an equi-partition with the slices {(S + T )1(1), . . . , (S + T )1(6)}. However, each entry of E with negative
value lies in a different slice in the other two partitions. Thus all but the last slice in these partitions have
total value 1− ε̃. We note that the entries with value −ε̃ correspond to entries of (S+T ) with positive value.
Thus if ε̃ is sufficiently small, all entries of the resulting tensor are non-negative.
We now create an instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 where the goods of M are the non-zero entries of tensor S+T
and each agent’s valuations are defined by the tensor assigned to their group. Since each agent can form an
equi-partition of the values, we have MMS6i = 1 for all agents i ∈ N . By allocating goods according to any
set of slices, we see that each agent receives at least 1− ε̃ of their MMS. Thus the optimal-MMS ratio is at
least 1− ε̃. However, since ε̃ is very small compared to the values of S and T , the only way to give each agent
at least 1− ε̃ value is to give them a slice of the tensor. However, since the slices have to be aligned, and only
one group of agents will accept any slice from a given partition, we see that any optimal-MMS allocation
gives at most one group (two agents) and a lucky agent who receives the last slice (with perturbation 5ε̃)
their full MMS.
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Generalizing to higher n. By continuing the patterns with valuations, we may extend our order 3 tensors
to dimensions (n×n×n). Thus by splitting agents into three groups, we may limit optimal-MMS allocations
to approximately 13 of the agents who receive their MMS. If we wish to keep the number of agents constant
as n grows larger, we need to partition agents into more groups. This can be achieved by embedding our
tensor into higher dimensions. In the full proof, we create d groups which leads to an order d tensor. This
leads to the more general result that with O(dn) goods, we can guarantee that only dnd e+ 1 agents receive
their MMS in any optimal-MMS allocation. By selecting d = bn2 c, we obtain a full proof of Theorem 1.
4.3 (α, β)-MMS for Small n
The previous section demonstrated that maximizing the value of β might minimize the value of α. With
this strong counter-example to optimize α and β simultaneously, we ask how slightly weakening α affects
the approximation ratio β.
The smallest relaxation of α, where α = n−1n , aims to satisfy all but one agent. Intuitively, by sacrificing
one agent, we may redistribute all goods that would have been allocated to them. When n is small, this
redistribution will have a greater impact on other agents’ bundles. For small values of n, we show that
we can outperform the 34 benchmark on all but one agent. Our analysis relies on a modified envy graph
algorithm proposed by Barman and Krishna Murthy [2017].
The envy graph algorithm as it was originally proposed by Lipton et al. [2004] guarantees EF1 through
a process known as envy cycle elimination. The algorithm operates on an envy graph G(A) = (V,E). The
vertices of G(A) correspond to the agents of a given instance, and an edge (i, j) is in E if agent i envies agent
j (vi(Ai) ≤ vi(Aj)). The algorithm proceeds in two phases: allocating a good and resolving cycles. Suppose
first that G(A) is acyclic. Thus G(A) has a vertex with no incoming edges, and there is an agent who is not
envied by any other agent. Then we may give that agent a new good without violating EF1 because this
good may be removed to eliminate envy. After adding this item, the envy graph may change. If no envy
cycle is created, we may continue this argument for the next good. Suppose that an envy cycle exists after
adding this good. That is, there is a sequence of agents (r1, r2, . . . rk) such that rk envies agent r1 and for
each 1 ≤ ri < k, agent ri envies agent ri+1. We may resolve this cycle by passing bundles backwards through
the cycle; agent ri is given the bundle originally given to agent ri+1 and agent rk is given the bundle of
agent r1. Since the valuation of each agent in the cycle strictly increases the sum
∑
i∈N vi(Ai) also strictly
increases. This cycle elimination may create new cycles. We may continue to resolve these cycles until the
resulting envy graph is acyclic. Since the set of possible partial allocations is finite, and because
∑
i∈N vi(Ai)
strictly increases at each step, this process will eventually terminate in an envy graph without cycles. This
process then repeats by giving the next good to some agent who is not envied by any other agent until there
are no goods remaining.
Barman and Krishna Murthy [2017] observed that no agent envies a bundle more than the last good
added to the bundle. Thus if the envy graph algorithm is modified to run only on ordered instances and the
goods are allocated in decreasing order of value, the resulting allocation is EFX.
Lemma 8. The modified envy graph algorithm (Algorithm 4.5) outputs an EFX allocation.
Proof. At the start of the algorithm, all bundles are empty which is EFX vacuously. Suppose that the start
of iteration j, the partial allocation including goods g1 to gj−1 is EFX. Let agent i be allocated good gj .
Since no agent envied agent i before good gj was allocated, each agent can remove good gj from Ai to remove
envy. Because goods are added in descending order of value, for each g ∈ Ai, vk(g) ≥ vk(gj) which implies
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Algorithm 4.5: Modified Envy Graph
Input : An ordered goods instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉
Output: An EFX allocation A
1 Initialize A = (∅, . . . , ∅);
2 for j = 1 to m do
3 Let i be a vertex in G(A) with no incoming edges;
4 Ai = Ai ∪ {gj};
5 while G(A) contains an envy cycle r1, . . . , rk do
6 For each 1 ≤ i < k, set Ari = Ari+1 and set Ak = A1;
that for each g ∈ Ai, vk(Ak) ≥ vk(Ai \ {gj}) ≥ vk(Ai \ {g}) and EFX is maintained. During envy cycle
elimination, the bundles stay the same and each agent’s value for the bundle they receive only increases.





for some g and A′l. Suppose agent m was the previous owner of bundle A
′
l. Since the partial allocation
before envy cycle elimination was EFX, this implies that vk(Ak) ≥ vk(Am \ {g}), but this implies that
vk(A
′
k) ≥ vk(Am \ {g}) = vk(A′l \ {g}). Thus agent k does not envy agent l by more than the least valuable
good. Since this holds for each k and l after envy cycle elimination, the resulting partial allocation is EFX.
Thus before good j + 1 is allocated, the partial allocation is EFX, and after all m goods are allocated, the
resulting allocation is EFX.
We now show that this same modified envy graph algorithm allows us to compute strong β approximations
of MMS for small n with α = n−1n .
Lemma 9. Given an ordered instance such that ∀i ∈ N ,
• vi(g1) < 1
• vi({gn, gn+1}) < 1
• vi(M) = n
• n ≥ 4





Proof. Suppose that instance I satisfies the above conditions. Let A be an allocation produced by the
Algorithm 4.5 run on any n − 1 agents of I. When allocating the first n − 1 goods, there must always
be an agent who has not yet received a good by pigeonhole principle. Since the instance is reduced and
scaled such that vi(g1) < 1 and vi(M) = n, vi(gn) > 0 (or else there would be at least one good with value
vi(g) ≥ nn−1 > 1). As the instance is ordered, this implies that all agents have positive value for goods g1 to
gn. Thus any agent who has not yet received any good envies each agent who has already received a good.
Since the envy graph algorithm does not allocate an item to an envied agent, no agent is allocated a
second good until all bundles are allocated at least one good. Define S to be the set of agents who receive
only one good in the resulting allocation A and let s = |S|.
By Lemma 8, A satisfies EFX, i.e., for all j ∈ [n−1], vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ ĝj) for any good ĝj ∈ Aj . Summing
over the set of agents who receive at least two goods:

















((n− 1)− s)vi(Ai) ≥ (n− s)− vi(gn)− vi(gn+1) Bounding vi(ĵ) (only one gn)
− ((n− 1)− 1− s− 2)vi(gn+1)
((n− 1)− s)vi(Ai) ≥ (n− s)− 1− (n− s− 4)vi(gn+1) vi({gn, gn+1}) < 1
((n− 1)− s)vi(Ai) ≥ (n− s)− 1−
1
2
(n− s− 4) vi(gn+1) ≤
1
2
((n− 1)− s)vi(Ai) ≥ (n− s)−
1
2










) dividing by n− s− 1
vi(Ai) ≥
















) By monotonicity of
n+ 2
n− 1




vi(ĝj) contains (n-1) terms excluding s terms for j ∈ S. For each
corresponding agent j 6= i and j /∈ S, the last good allocated ĝj must have been from among goods gn
onward. However, only one such ĝj can be good gn. We separate the goods gn and gn+1 in order to use
vi({gn, gn+1}) to prove the bound.





Input : An instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉




n−1 ))-MMS allocation A
1 I ′ = Order(I); // Algorithm 4.1
2 I ′ = Scale(I ′, n); // Lemma 2
3 while ∃i ∈ N,S ∈ ({g1}, {gn, gn+1}), vi(S) ≥ 1 do
4 Allocate S to i;
5 N ′ = N ′ \ {i}, and M ′ = M ′ \ S;
6 I ′ =Scale(I ′, n′);
7 Let I ′ = 〈N ′ \ {i},M ′V ′〉 for some agent i ∈ N ′;
8 A′ = Modified Envy Graph(I ′) and A′i = ∅; // Algorithm 4.5
9 A = Unorder (A′, I); // Algorithm 4.2




n−1 ))-MMS exists and is polynomial time computable.
Proof. Consider Algorithm 4.6. Given an input instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, lines 1 through 6 construct a new
instance I ′ which ordered and reduced such that for all i ∈ N ′, vi(g1) < 1 and vi({gn′ , gn′+1}) < 1. Any
agent allocated a bundle during these steps receives value at least vi(A
′



















′ ≤ n and that n
′−1
n′ n
′ + (n − n′) = n − 1. Since unordering does not




n−1 ))-MMS on the original
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instance I. Lastly, we notice that the choice of n− 1 agents was arbitrary, so for each subset of n− 1 agents,
















Table 3: Approximation bounds achieved by Algorithm 4.6 for various n < 8 and any number of goods.
Table 3 shows the values achieved by Algorithm 4.6 for n = 3 to n = 7. We observe that for n < 7,
Algorithm 4.6 gives better than a 34 approximation of MMS
n+1. We also note, that by adding a dummy





One may consider settings where it is more important that a critical subset of agents/tasks are fulfilled than
the majority of them be started. For example, in order to prevent graduation delays, senior college students
must be guaranteed seats in classes. Likewise, when resources are scarce in a hospital, a subset of critical
tasks may maximize the number of surviving patients. In this setting, we may wish to maximize the number
of satisfied agents. In the context of envy-freeness or proportionality, no meaningful guarantee can be made
with respect to the number of satisfied agents. Consider n agents with identical valuations where there is
a single good worth 1− (n − 1)ε and n − 1 goods worth ε. Any distribution of goods will leave all but one
agent unsatisfied. In the maximin share setting, this leads us to the question, for what values of α does
(α, 1)-MMS exist and when can such allocations be computed efficiently?
Perhaps the most natural starting point is ( 12 , 1)-MMS. The following lemma shows that simple algorithms
attain this notion.
Proposition 2. If no agent values any good more than vi(M)n , then any EF1 allocation on any arbitrary half
of the agents satisfies ( 12 , 1)-MMS.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . , Abn/2c) be an EF1 allocation on half of the agents of a given instance. For each
pair of agents i, j ∈ [bn/2c], vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ gj) for some good gj ∈ Aj . Let g∗ be the most valuable good
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i , we iterate the reduction
{g1} (from Lemma 4) until no good is worth more than vi(M)n . Then we may select any arbitrary subset of
bn2 c agents and run any EF1 algorithm (e.g. Round-Robin). The resulting allocation will satisfy (
1
2 , 1)-MMS.
Since we may do this for each subset of bn2 c agents, we conclude that (
1
2 , 1)-MMS exists.




While EF1 allocations provide a simple way to compute 12 approximations for many MMS notions, they often
do not lend way to better approximations. A key question is whether we can improve α beyond 12 and show
the existence of such allocations. Using the ideas from (1, 23 )-MMS, we show the existence of (
2
3 , 1)-MMS
and discuss an algorithm achieving this bound in polynomial-time when n < 9 for any number of goods.
With the exception of computing MMSn for each agent, our proof of ( 23 , 1)-MMS existence is algorithmic
and runs in polynomial time.
Our algorithm extends bag-filling to the case where δ + ∆ > 1. In this setting, Lemma 7 still implies
that each bundle allocated has total value less than δ + ∆ to all agents; however, since δ + ∆ > 1, we may
no longer guarantee that each agent receives a bundle. The intuition for our algorithm is straightforward:
using the reductions {g1} and {gn, gn+1}, we guarantee that no good is worth MMSn and that there are at
most n goods worth MMS
n
2 . Then by initializing bundles to separate the high-value goods, we may bag-fill
where each item added to a bag has value less than MMS
n
2 to all agents. Thus each allocated bundle has
value at most 32MMS
n to all agents. We may continue to fill bundles while there is still value remaining,









While the algorithm idea is straightforward, if there are more than b 2n3 c high-value goods then we will
eventually have most of the remaining value tied up in high-value goods. We cannot allocate two high-
value goods to a single agent without caution as other agents may value that bundle more than 32MMS
n. To
address this problem, we introduce a notion of preview bundles. We allow each agent to form preview bundles
by running the ( 23 , 1)-MMS algorithm as if each agent had their own preferences, but we fix the division
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Algorithm 4.7: A ( 23 , 1)-MMS algorithm for n < 9
Input : Instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 on n agents
Output: A ( 2
3
, 1)-MMS allocation A
1 I ′ = Order(I); // Algorithm 4.1
2 I ′ = Scale(I ′, n′); // Lemma 2
3 while ∃i ∈ N,S ∈ ({g1}, {gn′ , gn′+1}), vi(S) ≥ 1 do
4 Allocate S to i;
5 N ′ = N ′ \ {i}, and M ′ = M ′ \ S;
6 I ′ = Scale(I ′, n′);
7 while |N ′| > 0 do
8 Label items in M ′ g1, g2, . . . , gm respectively;
9 Let H = {g ∈M ′|∃i ∈ N ′, vi(g) ≥ 12}, let h = |H|, and let L = M
′ \H;
10 Let B = {g1};
11 if ∃j ∈ N ′, vj(B ∪ L) ≥ 1 then
12 Add goods from L to B in descending order until some agent (say j) values B at least 1;
13 Temporarily allocate B to j and remove B from M ′ and j from N ′;
14 else
15 Let k = 0;
16 while ∃i ∈ N ′ such that vi(gh−k) ≥ 12 do
17 Allocate {gr+k, gh−k} to i and remove from N ′;
18 if |N ′| > 0 then
19 Undo all temporary allocations keeping i out of N ′;
20 A← Unorder(A, I) ; // Algorithm 4.2
of high and low-value goods. Since bag-filling is based on the moving knife protocol, we may make strong
comparisons between agents’ preview bundles and the bundles allocated by our ( 23 , 1)-MMS algorithm. This
comparison allows us to analyze agents individually in order to show that enough bundles are allocated when
bag-filling with the low-value goods. With this intuition, we now define necessary variables to sketch the
proof of ( 23 , 1)-MMS existence.
High/low-value goods. Given an ordered and scaled instance such that ∀i ∈ N,MMSi ≤ 1, a good
g ∈M is said to be high-value if there is an agent i ∈ N ′ such that vi(g) ≥ 12 , otherwise it is low-value. The
set of high-value goods is denoted by H = {g ∈ M | ∃i ∈ N ′, vi(g) ≥ 12} with h = |H|. Additionally, we
define the number of surplus high-value goods to be s = max(h− b 2n3 c, 0).
Theorem 3. ( 23 , 1)-MMS exists and can be computed in polynomial time with an oracle for MMS.
Proof sketch. We begin by selecting a subset of agents N ′ ⊆ N where |N ′| ⊆ b 2n3 c. We then order the
instance and scale valuations so that vi(M) = nMMS
n
i . We apply the reductions {g1} and {gn, gn+1} only
on agents of N ′ to guarantee that among N ′, no agent values a good MMSni = 1 or more and that there are




2 . Observe that this sequence of scaling and reductions is different
than in other (α, β)-MMS approximations. While agents in N \ N ′ may have valid reductions, our goal is
to guarantee that all agents in N ′ are guaranteed MMSni . Since our choice of N
′ is arbitrary, the agents
not in N ′ will be handled by a different choice of N ′. Since this proof holds for any choice of N ′, it follows
that ( 23 , 1)-MMS exists. We also note that the requirement of scaling valuations so that MMS
n
i = 1 for all
agents requires knowing agents’ MMS values. While such scaling can always be done, it cannot be done in
polynomial time unless P = NP since computing MMS values is NP-Hard.
We now begin a modified version of bag-filling that initializes each bundle with the most valuable good
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r ` s
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8
g9
b2n3 c
g9 g10 g11 g12 g13 g14 g15 g16 g17
Figure 13: The low-value goods g9 to g17 use a bag-filling procedure to be added to bundles initialized with a single
high-value good (g1 to g8 each). The bag-filling algorithm fills r bundles with ` left to fill when it runs out of low-value
goods. The remaining value is tied up with the surplus s high-value goods.
before bag-filling with only low-value goods. If there are high-value goods remaining, then each bundle will
have exactly one high-value good. A bundle is then allocated to the first agent in N ′, say agent i, for which
it is worth at least MMSni = 1 in value. Since we only ever add at most one high-value good worth less
than 1, every subsequent good has value at most 12 . By Lemma 7, we conclude that each allocated bundle
has value at most 32 to other agents. After an agent is allocated a bundle during bag-filling, we remove that
agent and their allocated bundle from N ′ and M ′ respectively. We note that this may update the set of high
goods H as it is possible that the removed agent was the only agent who valued gh at least
1
2 . Any such
good that was previously a high-value good is now fair game as a low-value good to other agents.
Suppose that this process stops after r bundles have been allocated. Let ` = b 2n3 c − r be the number of
bundles left to be allocated (see Figure 13). The total amount of remaining value to each agent in N ′ who












2`. While this remaining
value comes from low-value goods, we may continue to fill bundles. The challenge arises when the remaining
value is mostly comprised of high-value goods. We analyze cases based upon the number of surplus high
value goods s.
Case I: The simplest case is when s = 0. In this case, the number of high-value goods is at most b 2n3 c
implying that the remaining value of high-value goods is at most ` (each high-value good has value less than
1 and there are at most b 2n3 c − r = ` of them remaining). Thus the remaining value from low-value goods




2 . Thus if there are at least r + 1 high-value goods, then another bundle can be
filled with value at least 1 contradicting that bag-filling stopped. If h ≤ r, however, then all remaining value
comes from low-value goods and another bundle can be filled with only low-value goods, again contradicting
that bag-filling stopped. Since this holds for each r ≤ b 2n3 c and s doesn’t change, it must be the case that
each agent in N ′ will be allocated a bundle worth at least their MMSni .
Case II: When ` > s, we show by contradiction that bag-filling has not yet stopped. Let i ∈ N ′ be an
agent who has not yet received a bundle when bag-filling stopped. Consider the preview bundles made by
agent i with the set H fixed. We claim that the set of goods in the first k bundles of bag-filling is a subset
of the set of goods that agent i puts into their first k preview bundles. Intuitively, since bundles are filled
in the same order, we only have to consider when other agents shout before agent i. If other agents would
shout after agent i, then because agent i shouts first, their preview bundle and the bag-filling bundle will be
the same. Since goods are added to bundles in descending order of value, the number of items added before
agent i would shout during bag-filling is at most the number of items in agent i’s second preview bundle.
Induction on this argument proves the claim. Thus if agent i is able to form at least b 2n3 c − s preview
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bundles, then it must be the case that at least b 2n3 c − s bundles were allocated during bag-filling (or else
agent i would still be able to claim a bundle from the unallocated low-value goods). However, this would
imply that ` < s contradicting that bag-filling had stopped when ` > s. The main technical challenge in our
proof is showing that each agent is able to form at least 2(n − h) + s preview bundles given a fixed set of
high-value goods H.8 This proves the result as r ≥ 2(n − h) + s implies b 2n3 c − ` ≥ 2n − 2(b
2n
3 c + s) + s
which yields s ≥ `+ 2n− 3b 2n3 c ≥ `.
Case III: When ` ≤ s, we observe that there are at least 2` high-value goods remaining. Since we
remove agents from N ′ after allocating them a bundle from bag-filling, we know by the definition of high-
value goods that some remaining agent must value gh at least
1
2 . We may give that agent goods gr+1 and
gh as a bundle worth at least 1. Any agent who believes both of these goods are worth at least
1
2 also agrees
that there are `+ s high-value goods and may continue to pair high-value goods gr+k and gh−k. If less than
` bundles can be formed by pairing high-value goods this way, then all remaining agents believe that the
last k+ 1 high-value goods are worth less than 12 . Thus any bundle allocated by pairing high-value goods is
worth at most 32 for these agents. By updating the sets of high-value and low-value goods, these agents are
able to fill more bundles during bag-filling. Thus we undo all bundles allocated during the bag-filling steps,
but we keep any bundles allocated by pairing high-value goods. We now start a new iteration of bag-filling
with the additional low-value goods. We observe that any bundle allocated during bag-filling that decreased
|H| will still be allocated in the same order as |H| decreases further after we hit the point where pairing
occurred. Since the set of permanent allocations strictly increases in size at each iteration, this process will
eventually terminate with an allocation where at least b 2n3 c agents receive a bundle worth at least 1.
We observe that the assumption that MMSi = 1 for all agents cannot be satisfied in polynomial time. One
natural assumption would be that by using the PTAS of Woeginger [1997], we could compute ( 23 , 1−ε)-MMS.
In practice, however, this weakening may sometimes yield allocations which do not satisfy ( 23 , 1− ε)-MMS.
We construct a family of instances with n ≥ 9 in which a small error in computing the MMS bound causes
Algorithm 4.7 to stop before b 2n3 c bundles have been allocated. The challenge presented here is not unique
to our algorithm. Any algorithm which satisfies ( 23 , 1)-MMS must correctly determine that MMS
n
i = 1 − ε
for all agents. However, this task is NP-hard even when agents have identical valuations [Woeginger, 1997].
Remark 1. Consider n ≥ 9 agents with identical valuations as follows: n − 1 high-value goods of value
1− ε− ε̃, two goods of value 12 − ε, one good of value (n+ 1)ε, and n−1 goods of value ε̃, where ε ε̃. Then,
MMSni = 1− ε for all agents.
Algorithm 4.7 allocates three bundles during the bag-filling steps, accounting for the three goods of value
1 − ε − ε̃, both goods of value 12 − ε, and the good with value (n + 1)ε. After bag-filling, the remaining
high-value goods will be paired together to create a total of bn−42 c bundles of paired high-value goods. Thus,
Algorithm 4.7 only satisfies bn2 c+ 1 agents.
This surprising remark shows that an inexact MMS bound limits the guarantee of Algorithm 4.7 to at
most ( 12 , 1)-MMS. Fortunately, we are able to show that Algorithm 4.7 in fact computes an (
2
3 , 1)-MMS
allocation in polynomial time when n < 9, even without access to an MMS oracle.
Theorem 4. For n < 9, Algorithm 4.7 computes a ( 23 , 1)-MMS allocation in polynomial time.
8A proof of this claim can be found in Appendix C.
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Proof sketch. We assume bag-filling stopped after r = b 2n3 c − ` bundles and that there were s = max(h −
b 2n3 c, 0) surplus high-value goods. Again, we consider cases based on s and `. The proof for the cases where
s = 0 and ` ≤ s are identical to the cases in Theorem 3. When ` ≥ 2s the amount of value remaining from




2 )vi(gr+1) = `(
3
2 − vi(gr+1) ≥ 1− vi(gr+1) which
implies that another bundle may be filled. This contradicts that bag-filling stopped. We show by explicit
enumeration that if n < 9, then the cases where s < ` < 2s do not occur when vi(M) = n for all agents.
All above steps, including scaling agents’ valuation such that vi(M) = n and the steps of the bag-
filling algorithm and its iterations, only require polynomial-time computation. Thus, computing MMS 231
allocations for n < 9 is in polynomial time.
The analysis in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 are indifferent to the set of agents available in N ′. Con-
sequently, we may select which subset of b 2n3 c agents are given their full MMS. We also observe that the
instance given in Remark 1 is tight; when n < 9, bn2 c+ 1 ≥ b
2n
3 c. Furthermore, combining this construction
with case 3 of Theorem 4 implies that no smaller counter-example exists. We note that despite this bound,
the algorithm is still practical as there is no bound on the number of goods. For example, more than 99%
of instances in the Spliddit dataset deal with less than 9 agents.
4.6 Relationships Between MMS Approximations
We begin with a simple lemma which demonstrates the relationship between βMMSn and MMSγn.
Lemma 10. qMMSkq ≤ MMSk for any positive integers k and q.
Proof. Given kq bundles of an MMS partition, we can form a k partition of the same items by grouping q
bundles together k times. The lowest valued bundle of this partition gives a lower bound on MMSk. Thus
qMMSkq ≤ MMSk.
We observe that this relationship only holds when q is an integer. Consider q = 34 in the following two
instances:
(i) 12 goods with value 1
(ii) 6 goods with value 1; 6 goods with value 12
In the first instance 34MMS
3
4 ·12 = 34 ≤ 1 = MMS
12. In the second instance 34MMS
3




Thus we may neither say that qMMSkq ≤ MMSk nor qMMSkq ≥ MMSk in general when q is not an integer.
The most important consequence of Lemma 10 is that MMSn ≥ 2MMS2n. This implies that an algorithm
which computes (1, 12 )-MMS also computes MMS
2n. We now show that this can be leveraged to compute a
( 12 , 1)-MMS allocation.
Lemma 11. (α, 1)-MMS exists if and only if MMSd
n
α e exists.
Proof. Let I = 〈N,M, V 〉 be an additive instance where |N | = n. Add dnα − ne dummy agents to N and
call the new instance I ′ = 〈N ′,M, V 〉. Thus, n′ = |N ′| = n + dnα − ne = d
n
αe. (α, 1)-MMS existence on
I ′ implies that for each subset N ′′ of αn′ agents, an allocation exists which gives each agent in N ′′ their
MMSN
′
. Since bαn′c = bαdnαec ≥ bα(
n
α )c = bnc = n we may select the original subset N ⊆ N
′. Thus there
exists an allocation A = (A1, . . . An) such that for all i ∈ N, vi(Ai) ≥ MMS|N
′|





i , which implies MMS
dnα e
i exists for I.
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Figure 14: Fraction of agents, α, receiving their maximin share, i.e., (α, 1)-MMS.
For the reverse direction, suppose that MMSd
n
α e exists. Consider an additive instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉
with |N | = n. Select n′ = bαnc of these agents arbitrarily as N ′. Call the new instance I ′ = 〈N ′,M, V 〉.
Since MMSd
n′
α e exists, then all agents in N ′ can be guaranteed at least this value. Replacing n′ with bαnc,
we get dn
′




α (αn)e = dne = n which implies that bαnc agents received MMS
dn′α e ≥ MMSn
and thus the resulting allocation satisfies (α, 1)-MMS on I.
One consequence of the previous lemma is that any (1, 12 )-MMS algorithm can also be used to satisfy
( 12 , 1)-MMS. More importantly, combining Theorem 3 with Lemma 11 shows that MMS
b 3n2 c exists which
significantly improves the previous boundary of MMS2n−2 [Aigner-Horev and Segal-Halevi, 2019]. We note
that this is the first non-trivial improvement over the MMS2n approximation.
Corollary 2. Given an additive instance, an allocation satisfying MMSd
3n
2 e always exists. Moreover, such
allocations can be computed in polynomial time when n < 6.
4.7 Empirical Evaluations
We empirically evaluated Algorithm 4.7 both on synthetic and real datasets. In simulated experiments,
we focused on ordered instances as they are the most difficult instances in achieving MMS [Bouveret and
Lemâıtre, 2016]. Valuations were sampled uniformly at random, and then ordered and scaled such that
vi(M) = n for all i ∈ N . We generated 1, 000 instances for each combination of n and m.
Figure 14 illustrates the outcome of Algorithm 4.7 for n = 5 to 100 agents and m = 5 to 300 goods. In
almost all instances, the (23 , 1)-MMS algorithm goes beyond its
2
3 bound: more than 88% of agents receive
their MMS, with this bound improving as either n or m increases. We observe linear bands where a lower
fraction of agents are satisfied due to the ratio of goods to agents. The most prominent of these occurs along
the line m = 3.43n+ 2.46, which was found via linear regression along points where less than 88% of agents
receive their MMS. These occurrences account for only 3.64% of total observations.
To paint a more complete picture, we compared the performance of our algorithm with the (1, 23 )-MMS
algorithm of Garg et al. [2018] as shown in Figure 15. We observe that although the (1, 23 )-MMS algorithm
guarantees 23MMSi, for all i ∈ N , in almost all instances only a small fraction of agents receive their MMS.
Lastly, we evaluated the performance of Algorithm 4.7 given real fair division instances from Spliddit
[Goldman and Procaccia, 2014]. Table 4 shows the number of real world instances where our algorithm
allocated various fractions of agents their full MMS guarantee. We observe that Algorithm 4.7 satisfied more
than 23 of the agents in all 2, 395 fair division instances (with n ≥ 3) and in most instances satisfied all agents
(72% of instances). In contrast, the MMS1 23 approximation algorithm from Garg et al. [2018] only satisfied
26
45% of the agents. Figure 16 compares the distribution of instances where various fractions of agents receive
their MMS.
0.69 0.86 1.00 1.00
0.52 0.76 0.91 1.00
0.44 0.67 0.82 0.92
0.36 0.51 0.71 0.83
0.30 0.46 0.63 0.76
0.23 0.38 0.52 0.70
0.25 0.32 0.49 0.62
0.21 0.27 0.46 0.49
0.15 0.26 0.37 0.47
0.09 0.25 0.30 0.43
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Figure 15: Fraction of agents receiving their MMS under Garg et al.’s MMS1 23 algorithm.
Fraction Satisfied Garg et al. Algorithm Algorithm 4.7
1 1,094 1,744
0.75 – 0.83 23 12
0.67 930 639
0.4 – 0.6 14 0
0.33 297 0
0 – 0.33 37 0
Total 2,395 2,395
Table 4: Number of instances where Algorithm 4.7 and the (1, 23 )-MMS algorithm by Garg et al. [2018]
satisfy various fractions of the agents. The instances are from the Spliddit dataset selecting for n ≥ 3.
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Figure 16: Fraction of agents receiving their MMS under the ( 23 , 1)-MMS (Alg. 4.7) and (1,
2
3 )-MMS (Garg
et al. [2018]) algorithms on Spliddit data.
5 Maximin Share for Chores
5.1 A Discussion on Definitions
The definition of Maximin Share is well-defined for chores. Each agent still tries to divide chores into the
most favorable partition for themself given that they must select last. Viewing chores as negatively valued






While analysis in this domain is relatively straightforward, it is often helpful to think about chores by the
magnitude of their value rather than their exact value. For example, a key aspect in approximating MMS
for goods is bounding the best items. Intuitively, these techniques target the items which are least divisible;
however, for chores instances, the least divisible items are the worst chores. In light of this intuition, some
research on chores operates on positive dis-utilities where each agent’s goal is to minimize the amount of
dis-utility they receive. In this setting, the goal of maximin share is replaced with a perverse minimax share.
That is, each agent requires at most as much dis-utility as the minimum they can guarantee themself by
selecting a partition if they are required to pick their worst bundle (the bundle with highest dis-utility).
Definition 10. The minimax share (mMS) guarantee is the amount of value an agent can guarantee if they
select their favorite bundle from their worst partition. Formally





An allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . An) ∈ Πn(M) is a satisfies the β perverse minimax share criteria if for all
i ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≤ βmMSni (M, vi).
This relationship between the maximin share for chores and the perverse minimax share are characterized
in the following lemma by Aziz et al. [2017].9
Lemma 12. An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M) satisfies βMMSn for I if and only if A is a solution
of the perverse βmMS problem for the corresponding instance −I.
9This lemma is stated as a proposition without proof in Aziz et al. [2017]. We add a proof for completeness.
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Proof. We first prove that −MMSki (M, vi) = mMS
k
i (M,−vi). Consider any partition (P1, . . . , Pk) ∈ Πk(M).
When multiplying valuations by −1, the minimum valued bundle becomes the maximum valued bundle.
Likewise, over the set of values corresponding to minimum bundles in each partition, multiplying by −1
maps the maximum such value to the minimum such value. Thus:
















Furthermore, any maximin partition on I corresponds to a minimax partition on −I. Now suppose that
A = (A1, . . . , Ak) ∈ Πk satisfy vi(Ai) ≥ βMMSki (I) for all i ∈ [k]. Then −vi(Ai) ≤ −βMMS
k
i (M, vi) =
βmMSki (M,−vi). Observe that this result is bi-directional implying an equivalence between maximin share
allocations and perverse minimax allocations.
In the context of goods, we have a few fairly intuitive approximations for MMS. The most common
approximation is to appease everybody by guaranteeing each agent receives a β fraction of their MMS.
Likewise, we might also approximate MMS by telling agents that they must share goods among γn agents
where γ ≥ 1. In this approximation each agent expects to receive less value, so we may satisfy their MMSγn.
Alternatively, we proposed approximating MMS by giving α fraction of the agents their full MMS value. We
showed some interpolations between these notions, and addressed relevant open problems.
In the context of chores, these notions are somewhat less intuitive. Inexact partitions leave agents with
less value than their MMS, and thus these agents receive a greater magnitude of work than they were
expecting. Thus we may naturally extend β approximations by requiring that each agent receives at most
β ≥ 1 times their MMS value. When we consider allocating chores, agents are unsatisfied if they receive too
much work. One intuitive way to prevent overburdening agents is to introduce freelancers to the market to
reduce the actual workload on each agent. However, an important question arises when we ask how much
work the freelancer is allowed to perform. Clearly we may always add a freelancer with zero value for all
chores and receive a trivial allocation (the freelancer takes all chores) which satisfies MMS for all agents in
the market (including the freelancer).
One possible idea is to have freelancers take valuations based on agents within the market. The simplest
way to achieve this is to have freelancers which duplicate agents valuations. Trivially, this gives MMS
existence with n − 1 freelancers added to the market: create n − 1 copies of any agent in the market and
allocate bundles to each copy (including the original) according to their MMS partition for n agents.
Another possible extension is to allow freelancers to have valuations which are a convex combination of
the valuations of other agents. Either for each chore individually or for each valuation profile. While each
of these possibilities are mathematically interesting in their own right, they hint towards a less ambiguous
notion which generalizes the γ approximations of goods. Instead of adding agents to the market after agents
compute their MMS, we may tell agents to compute their MMS with fewer agents in the market. If agents
expect to be understaffed, they will be mentally prepared for a higher workload and thus might be satisfied
with allocations which are close to satisfying MMSn. In this case, we wish to give all n agents in the market
at least as much value as their MMSγn where γ ≤ 1.
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In the case of chores, we formalize these approximations with the following definitions.
Definition 11. Consider an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M).
• We say A satisfies MMSγn (where γ ≤ 1) if vi(Ai) ≥ MMSγni for each agent i ∈ N .
• We say A satisfies βMMSn (where β ≥ 1) if vi(Ai) ≥ βMMSni (Aziz et al. [2017]).
As in the case of goods, the definitions for chores are related for integer multiples.
Lemma 13. qMMSkq ≤ MMSk for any positive integers k and q.
Proof. Given n = kq bundles of an MMS partition, we can form a k partition of the same items by grouping
q bundles together k times. The lowest valued bundle of this partition gives a lower bound on MMSk. Thus
qMMSkq ≤ MMSk.
Like in the case for goods, this relationship only holds when q is an integer. Consider q = 34 in the
following two instances:
(i) 9 chores with value −1; 3 chores with value − 12
(ii) 6 chores with value −1; 6 chores with value − 12





9. In the second instance MMS12 = −1 ≤ 34 · −1 =
3
4MMS
9. Thus we claim neither qMMSkq ≤ MMSk nor qMMSkq ≥ MMSk hold in general when q is not an
integer.
Lastly, we observe that the notion of (α, 1)-MMS is trivial in the context of chores. We may always
satisfy all but one agent by giving all chores to a single agent. Since each other agent receives value 0, they
are satisfied.
Observation 1. For a chores instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, (n−1n , 1)-MMS exists by giving all chores to any
agent.
5.2 Optimal-MMS fails for Chores
We observe that the optimal-MMS counterexample for goods extends to the case of chores with relatively
simple modifications. Similar to the case of goods, this shows that we cannot hope to optimize both α and
β simultaneously in MMS approximations.
Theorem 5. For every n ≥ 4, there exists an instance with O(n2) chores where every optimal-MMS alloca-
tion guarantees at most 3 (4 if n is odd) agents their MMS value.
The proof for chores is almost identical to the proof for goods.10 By multiplying (S + T ) by −1, the
same combinatorial structure holds where each agent is able to form an equi-partition with each set having
value −1. Since Prop still implies MMS in the context of chores, MMSi ≤ −1 implying tightness where each
agent has MMSi = −1. When we enforce that the partitions are unique (by adding matrix E), we need to
continue to enforce that all but one slice is inadequate in the other partitions. Thus as long as we do not
multiply E by −1, the same structure will still hold yielding a similar counterexample.
We observe that Theorem 5 has larger implications beyond optimal-MMS. Prior to this work, Aziz et al.
[2017] proved that for three agents, there exists an instance on 12 chores where MMS does not exist. While
10The full proof can be found in Appendix D.
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this result generalized the construction for n = 3 to the case of chores, it was previously not shown that
such a counterexample still held for any n > 3. We observe that Theorem 5 proves that for any n ≥ 4, that
there exists an instance where MMS does not exist.
Corollary 3. For any n ≥ 4, there exists a chores instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 for which no MMS allocation
exists.
5.3 A Discussion of Translating Standard Lemmas from Goods
In the context of goods, we rely upon the following ideas to build simple algorithms to approximate MMS:
scale invariance, proportionality upper bound, ordering instances, reductions, and bag-filling.
Scale Invariance. In chores instances, the maximin share allocation remains independent of scale. Each
agent only cares about how they partition goods to compute their maximin share values and scaling all chore
values simultaneously leaves each bundle scaled the same amount as the maximin share. The proof of scale
invariance for chores is identical to the proof of scale invariance for goods. Because of this, we may often
choose to scale instances so that MMSi ≥ −1 for all agents.
Proportionality Upper Bound. For chores the proof that MMSki ≤
vi(M)
k still holds.
Lemma 14. MMSki ≤
vi(M)
k for chores instances.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that MMSki >
vi(M)
k . Then adding together all bundles of an MMS partition
yields vi(M) ≥ kMMSki > k
vi(M)
k = vi(M) which is a contradiction.
Ordering Instances. Independent of item valuations, ordered instances present the most conflict among
agents. When agents agree on the order of item valuations, they might compete to receive each item in turn
rather than assign each agent their unique favorites before moving on to the next item. Naturally, the rela-
tionship between ordered instances and MMS still holds, and the algorithm by [Barman and Krishna Murthy,
2017] still allows us to consider only identical ordinal preferences. However, it is often convenient to define
ordered instances for chores so that |v(b1)| ≥ |v(b2)| ≥ . . . ≥ |v(bm)|.
Definition 12. A chores instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 is ordered if there exists a labeling of the chores such that
for all i ∈ N , |vi(b1)| ≥ |vi(b2)| ≥ . . . ≥ |vi(bm)|.
With this new definition of an ordered instance, we adapt the ordering and unordering algorithms for
goods with simple modifications. The corresponding algorithms for chores can be seen in Algorithm 5.1 and
Algorithm 5.2.
Lemma 15. Let I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉 be an ordered chores instance constructed from the original instance
I = 〈N,M, V 〉. Given allocation A′ on I ′, a corresponding allocation A on I can be computed in polynomial
time such that for all i ∈ N, vi(Ai) ≥ v′i(A′i).
Proof. Consider Algorithm 5.2. The proof is nearly identical to the proof for goods. We merely observe that
the assumption |vi(b1)| ≥ |vi(b2)| ≥ . . . ≥ |vi(bm)| on chores implies that vi(bm) ≥ vi(bm−1) ≥ . . . ≥ vi(b1).
Thus in both ordering and unordering, we reverse the order in which we address items. Suppose agent i
received their kth favorite item: b(m+1)−k; it is still the case that after unordering the first k− 1 items, their
kth favorite item must still remain unallocated. This implies that agent i is able to take a chore worth at
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Algorithm 5.1: Ordering an Instance
Input : Instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 on n agents
Output: An Ordered instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉
1 for j = 1 to m do
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 Let b = agent i’s jth most valuable item;
4 v′i(b(m+1)−j) = vi(b);
Algorithm 5.2: Unordering an Allocation
Input : Allocation A′ = (A′1, . . . , A
′
n) for an
ordered instance I ′ of I
Output: Allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) for the
unordered instance I
1 A = (∅, . . . , ∅) and M ′ = M ;
2 for j = m to 1 do
3 Let agent i be the agent who received bj in
A′i;
4 Let b = arg maxb∈M′ vi(b);
5 Ai = Ai ∪ {b} and M ′ = M ′ \ {b};
Figure 17: Algorithms for ordering a chores instance and unordering a chores allocation.
least vi(b(m+1)−k) at this step. Since this property holds by induction, and the best item is always available
first, we see that each item allocated during unordering is at least as valuable as the corresponding item
allocated in the ordered instance. Thus vi(Ai) ≥ v′i(A′i) by additivity of items in Ai and A′i.
Reductions. The idea of a reduction still holds for chores instances. If there is some bundle S worth at
least MMSni to agent i and no other agent’s MMS decreases after allocating that bundle (MMS
n−1
j (M \S) ≥
MMSnj (M) for all j 6= i), then we may allocate that bundle to agent i leaving a reduced instance.
While the definition of reductions still hold, we cannot use the same reductions for chores as we do for
goods. The reductions for goods rely upon the fact that redistributing items from one bundle of a partition
weakly increases the value of other bundles. However, in the context of chores, this assumption does not
hold. In fact, even the simple {g1} reduction does not hold for chores.
Example 1. Consider an instance with 3 agents and 6 chores each with value −0.5. MMS3(M) = −1 for
each agent, but removing a single good and a single agent leaves MMS2(M \ {b}) = −1.5.
Likewise, the other reductions for goods not hold for chores. We may generalize the above example for
the reduction {gkn−(k−1), . . . , gkn+1}.
Example 2. Consider an instance with 3 agents and 3(k + 2) chores of value − 1k+2 . Trivially, each agent
has MMS3(M) = −1, so any a bundle B of k + 1 chores has value −k+1k+2 ≥ MMS
3. However, removing a
single good and this bundle leaves 2k + 5 items and MMS2(M \B) = −k+3k+2 < MMS
3(M).
Despite this apparent loss of a critical tool, there is still good news for chores algorithms. We observe
that the objective of the reductions for goods is to upper bound the largest magnitude of goods. In the case
of chores, we may still use the intuition from goods reductions without actually having the same reductions
available. Consider for example b1, the chore with largest magnitude. Since this chore must be in a bundle of
the MMS partition, we know that MMSi ≤ vi(b1). Consequently, we may again say that |vi(b1)| ≤ |MMSi|.
Likewise, this same relationship with goods holds for each standard reduction.
Lemma 16. Let I = 〈N,M, V 〉 be an ordered chores instance. For each 0 ≤ k < mq , there are at most kq
chores b such that |vi(b)| ≥ |
MMSqi
k+1 |.
Proof. Consider the last k+ 1 of the first kq+ 1 chores; we know that at least k+ 1 of these must fall within
the same bundle of any MMSq partition (by pigeonhole). The magnitude of these chores are minimized if
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the lowest k + 1 magnitude of these chores fall into the same bundle. Since the lowest value bundle of any
MMSq partition contains at most as much magnitude as these k+ 1 chores, we may say that MMSqi is worth
at most vi({bkq−(k−1), . . . bkq+1}). Since the chores are ordered, we know that vi(bkq+1) ≥
MMSqi
k+1 . In turn,
this implies that there are at most kq chores worth less than
MMSqi
k+1 .
Lemma 16 implies that most of the results derived from reductions for goods still hold for the case
of chores. For example, setting q = n and k = 0 shows that there are no chores with value |vi(b)| ≥
|MMSni |. Likewise, setting k = 1 implies that there at most n goods with value |vi(b)| ≥ |
MMSni (M)
2 | as
|vi({bn, bn+1})| ≤ |MMSni |. While this extends most of the reduction for goods, there is still one important
result which comes from goods reductions which extends to the case of chores: a lower bound on the number
of items.
Lemma 17. If m < 2n, giving {b1} to any agent is a valid reduction.
Proof. If the total number of items is less than 2n, there must be some bundle in every MMS partition which
contains only a single item. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the worst chore is in a bundle
by itself. Since this holds for all agents, and we may assume without loss of generality that the instance is
ordered, all agents value b1 at least as much as their maximin share. Furthermore, removing a single agent
and chore b1 does not change any of the remaining bundles, and thus does not decrease the MMS. This
implies that whenever m < 2n, there exists a reduction by giving any agent chore b1.
By repeatedly applying the reduction from Lemma 17, we can focus our attention on cases where m ≥ 2n.
Bag-Filling. Bag-filling for goods is inspired by the moving-knife algorithm: we (discretely) move a knife
along the set of goods and allocate it whenever it becomes sufficient in value for some agent. By upper
bounding the value of the allocated bundle to other agents, we guarantee that there is enough remaining
value other agents may still fill bundles as desired. When we consider the equivalent algorithm for chores,
the objective is flipped. Since each agent may take an empty bundle, the challenge is to ensure that all
chores are allocated. Thus when we fill a bundle, we wish to maximize the number of chores added to the
bundle before it is allocated. As long as some agent still finds the bundle acceptable, we may continue to
add chores. This idea is formalized in Algorithm 5.3. This algorithm, originally proposed by Huang and Lu





Huang and Lu [2019] prove that Algorithm 5.3 computes an 119 MMS
n allocation. However, computing these
threshold values is NP-Hard. They further prove that using a PTAS for MMS, it is possible to compute an
5
4MMS
n allocation in polynomial time.
For intuition, we leverage this approximation technique to compute both 2MMSn and 32MMS
n with
simple analysis. Suppose that valuations are scaled so that min(vi(b1),
vi(M)
n ) = −1. Thus we know that
MMSi ≤ −1. If we select βi = −2 for each agent then run Algorithm 5.3, the resulting allocation is a
2-approximation for MMS.
Proposition 3. If valuations are scaled so that min(vi(b1),
vi(M)
n ) = −1 for all i ∈ N , then Algorithm 5.3
with βi = −2 for all i ∈ N returns an allocation where vi(Ai) ≥ 2MMSi for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Observe that all agents receive a bundle under Algorithm 5.3 as any agent may always take ∅. By




i by Lemma 14. Thus the scaling guarantees that MMS
n
i ≤ −1
for all agents, and since each agent is allocated a bundle worth more than −2, they receive a bundle worth
more than 2MMSni .
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Algorithm 5.3: Bag-filling for Chores
Input : An ordered chores instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, threshold values of agents (β1, . . . , βn)
Output: An allocation A
1 Let M ′ = M , N ′ = N , and A = (∅, . . . , ∅);
2 for k = 1 to n do // Loop to generate bundles
3 B = ∅;
4 Let b1, b2, . . . , bm′ be the order of chores in M
′;
5 for j = 1 to |M ′| do // From the largest chore to the smallest
6 if ∃i ∈ N ′, vi(B ∪ {bj}) ≤ βi then
7 B = B ∪ {bj};
8 Let i ∈ N ′ be an agent such that vi(B) ≤ βi;
9 Ai = B; M
′ = M ′ \B; and N ′ = N ′ \ i;
10 return A;
Consider the last agent, say agent i, to receive a bundle. Since agent i could not add any remaining chore
to any allocated bundle, we see that for each j 6= i, vi(b) + vi(Aj) ≤ −2. However, since vi(b) ≥ −1, this
implies that vi(Aj) ≤ −1. Since this holds for all n − 1 other agents, the total value remaining is at least
vi(M) − (n − 1)(−1) = nvi(M)n + (n − 1) ≥ n(−1) + (n − 1) = −1 > 2MMS
n
i . Thus agent i can take all
remaining chores and still be satisfied.
Like in the case of goods, a very simple modification to this algorithm guarantees a 32 -approximation of
MMS with very simple analysis. By Lemma 16, we know that there are at most n chores with value at most
MMSni
2 . If we initialize bundles so that chores b1 to bn all accounted for before bag-filling starts, each chore
added during bag filling has value at least
MMSni
2 . Using this idea, we can improve the simple approximation
to 32MMS
n.





If we initialize bundles so that for all j ∈ [n], bj ∈ Aj and select βi = − 32 for all i ∈ N , then Algorithm 5.3
computes an 32MMS
n allocation.
Proof. Since vi({bn, bn+1}) ≥ min(vi(b1), vi({bn, bn+1}), vi(M)n ) = −1, we have that vi({bn, bn+1}) ≥ −1.
Since the instance is ordered, this implies vi(bn+1) ≥ − 12 .
Also, by Lemma 14 and Lemma 16, MMSni ≤ min(vi(b1), vi({bn, bn+1}),
vi(M)
n ). Thus, MMS
n
i ≤ −1.
Since agents are only allocated bundles worth more than − 32 , we only need to show that all items are
allocated.
Consider the last agent to receive a bundle, say agent i. Since agent i could not add any remaining item
b to any item allocated to other agents, vi(Aj) + vi(b) ≤ − 32 . However, since each remaining chore (other
than bn) has value greater than − 12 , we see that vi(b) > −
1
2 . This implies that for all j 6= i, vi(Aj) ≤ −1.
Since n− 1 other agents have been allocated bundles, the remaining value is at least vi(M)− (n− 1)(−1) ≥
−n+ (n− 1) = −1. Thus agent i can take all remaining chores.
34
5.4 Computing MMSγn
In the previous section, we showed how to compute a 32MMS
n allocation using simple techniques. With a
more complicated analysis, Huang and Lu [2019] proved that Algorithm 5.3 computes a 54MMS
n allocation
in polynomial time, and with access to an MMS oracle it can compute an 119 MMS
n allocation. While our
analysis does not push the boundaries of maximin share approximations for chores, it introduces the tech-
niques needed to prove a different MMS approximation. In the context of goods, we showed that MMSd
3
2ne
exists. Using the techniques from the previous section, we prove that the corresponding approximation exists
for chores. That is, each agent can be guaranteed their MMSb
2
3nc value.
We first illustrate the nuanced differences between βMMS and MMSγ . Lemma 13 shows that if q is an
integer then qMMSqk ≤ MMSk. Thus if n2 is an integer, 2MMS
2(n2 ) ≤ MMS
n
2 . However, it is possible that
MMS
n
2 > 2MMSn. In this case, we cannot simply guarantee that each agent receives a bundle worth at least
2MMSn. When considering MMSγn, it is possible that MMSγn = MMSn. Consider the following instance:
n + 1 chores all of value −1. For γ ∈ [ 12 +
1
2n , 1], MMS
bγnc = −2. Thus relaxing γ does not change the
maximin share value.
We observe that βMMSn ; MMS
1
βn. However, we observe that like goods, MMSk is monotonic in k for
chores.
Proposition 5. If a ≤ b then MMSa ≤ MMSb.
Proof. Consider an MMS partition A = (A1, . . . Aa) for MMS
a. We extend A into a b-partition by adding
b− a empty bundles so that A′ = (A1, . . . , Aa, ∅, . . . , ∅). Observe that the minimum bundle of this partition
has value at least MMSa and thus MMSb = maxB=(B1,...,Bb)∈Πb(M) minj∈[b] vi(Bj) ≥ minj∈[b] vi(A′j) =
MMSa.
We observe that if a < b and MMSa = MMSb then the bound MMSb ≤ vi(M)b is not tight as MMS
b =
MMSa ≤ vi(M)a <
vi(M)
b . While the possibility of MMS
γn = MMSn implies that we may not trivially adapt
the βMMSn algorithm, this looseness gives hope that for another algorithm for MMSγn. In the following
theorem, we prove that Algorithm 5.3 can be adapted to compute MMSb
2
3nc.
Theorem 6. For additive chores instances, MMSb
2
3nc exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let q = b 23nc. We initialize bundles A1 to Aq with chores b1 to bq respectively. Then we pair chores
bq+1 to b2q to initialize d q2e bundles (Aq+1 to Aq+d q2 e) with at most 2 chores each. It is important to note













3 e = n. Thus we have initialized at most n bundles.
By Lemma 16, we know that vi(b1) ≥ MMSqi and that vi(bq, bq+1) ≥ MMS
q
i for all i ∈ N . Since the instance
is ordered all initial bundles have value at least MMSq to all agents. We observe that this is true regardless
of how the instance is scaled.
We now scale valuations so that vi(M)n = −1. For each agent, we select
βi = min
(












= − 32 .
If we run Algorithm 5.3 using the above initialization, scaling, and β values, we claim that the resulting
allocation satisfies MMSq. It is easy to see that each allocated bundle is worth more than βi to the agent
who received it. Thus vi(Ai) ≥ βi ≥ MMSqi . Furthermore, since every bundle is initialized so that vi(Aj) ≥
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MMSqi , all agents may accept bundles as they were initialized. Thus each agent will receive a bundle. All
that we need to show now is that all items are allocated when the algorithm terminates.
Consider the last agent to receive a bundle, say agent i. Since agent i was not able to add any remaining
chore to any bundle allocated to another agent, we have vi(Aj) + vi(b) ≤ βi for each remaining chore
b. Since the instance is ordered and vi({b2q−1, b2q, b2q+1} ≥ βi, we see that vi(b2q+1) ≥ βi3 . Combining
this with the fact that all remaining chores (other than b2q−1andb2q) have value at least vi(b2q+1), we
have that each allocated bundle must have value at most vi(Aj) ≤ 23βi. However, because βi ≤ −
3
2 ,
this implies that vi(Aj) ≤ 23 (−
3
2 ) = −1. Since this holds for each j 6= i, the total amount of remaining
value is at most vi(M) − (n − 1)(−1) ≥ −1. Thus agent i may take all remaining chores and still satisfy
vi(Ai) ≥ −1 ≥ MMSqi .
5.5 A Comparison with Goods
Maximin share approximations for chores are typically much easier to compute than their counterpart for
goods. Perhaps the most important difference between goods and chores comes from the notion of reductions.
For goods, we need to have an approximation of the maximin share values before we may commit to a
reduction. For chores, the results for reductions hold whether or not we know the maximin share value.
For example, we know that if there is a good worth more than the maximin share to some agent, then we
may reduce our instance by allocating that good to the interested agent. For chores, we know that there
is no chore worth less than the maximin share. If exact approximation is not necessary, we may tolerate
an estimate of the maximin shares for goods when we perform this reduction. However, as in the case
of Remark 1, it is often the case that even a slight error in the maximin values may prevent algorithms
from allocating appropriately. In this situation, we may prove the existence of certain approximations with
non-efficient algorithms.
Another important distinction between goods and chores is the notion of desirability. When one agent
takes a good with high magnitude, this creates a natural envy from other agents. However, in the case of
chores, taking higher magnitude chores only makes other agents less envious of you. As goods become less
divisible, agents compete more for the goods; however, as chores become less divisible, agents compete to
not take them.
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6 Conclusions and Future Directions
6.1 Conclusions
In the traditional MMS approximation setting, it is known that a (1, 34 )-MMS allocation can always be
computed efficiently. We have shown that maximizing this approximation may yield allocations where almost
every agent is unsatisfied. Consequently, we proposed a novel fairness notion based on the population of
agents. We showed that for small values of n, sacrificing a single agent can increase the fraction guaranteed
to other agents, and along the way, we proved that MMSn+1 can be computed for 3 agents. We proved
that for every goods instance, there always exists an allocation which gives at least 23 of the agents their
MMS guarantee, and for n < 9, such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time. In practice, we
empirically demonstrated that our algorithm for n < 9 outperforms its guarantee and computes ( 23 , 1)-MMS
for all but pathological counterexamples. Using the ( 23 , 1)-MMS existence result, we proved that MMS
d 32ne
exists pushing the previous bound of 1-out-of-2n− 2 MMS.
In the context of chores, we discussed various approximations of maximin share. We extended the proof
that there exists instances for chores where MMS does not exist to any n. We explored the standard lemmas
from goods and translated them as closely as possible to chores. We demonstrated simple algorithms for
computing (1, 32 )-MMS for chores using these new lemmas. The ideas of this algorithm were extended into
a MMSb
2
3nc algorithm for chores.
6.2 Future Directions
Our work provides an important starting point in population based approximations of fairness. In this work,
we showed that 23 approximations are achievable for both goods and chores; however, the techniques used to
achieve these approximations do not immediately extend into stronger approximations. Therefore, the most
natural open question is for what values of α does (α, 1)-MMS exist? Similarly, what is the smallest value
n′ such that MMSn
′
exists? In a different setting, where items can be over-allocated, Budish [2011] proved
that MMSn+1 exists. However, when only feasible allocations are considered, tight upper and lower bounds
of n′ remain an open problem.
Another important intermediate problem is whether stronger (α, β)-MMS interpolations can be achieved.
For example, one might expect that by using the reductions {g1}, {gq, gq+1}, we can bag-fill so that each




bundles (simplifying gives αβ ≈ 23 ). This intuition leads to algorithms for (
2
3 , 1)-MMS and (1,
2
3 )-MMS;











In our research, we offer no guarantee to agents not selected as part of the bαnc agents. However, in
our experiments, we often saw that after ( 23 , 1)-MMS was satisfied, there was significant value remaining.
While we continued to try to optimize α, another alternative is to maximize β for the remaining agents. In
either case, we wish to waste as little value as possible. This leads us to an important question regarding
economic efficiency. We know that whenever an (α, β)-MMS allocation exists, so too must an (α, β)-MMS
+ PO allocation. However, at this point, we have not discussed finding such an allocation. Direct Pareto
improvements are NP-Hard to find, so new algorithms which guarantee PO allocations must be considered.
While the notion of (α, β)-MMS doesn’t naturally extend to chores, population based approximations
did extend to that setting. Another important setting is when we combine goods and chores to form mixed
allocations. While Kulkarni et al. [2020] demonstrated that many MMS problems become NP-Hard in
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this domain, we first ask which, if any, population based approximations of MMS are meaningful in mixed
domains. We also observe that our notions of reductions for both goods and chores settings relied upon
the fact that all valuations had the same sign. For example, adding chores to an instance means we can no
longer redistribute items when forming reductions for goods. Thus we ask if any of the standard lemmas
will extend to mixed settings.
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A Polynomial Time Approximation Schemes (PTAS)
A polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) is an approximation algorithm that offers a tradeoff
between running time and accuracy. Typically in order to have an error tolerance of ε, a PTAS will incur
an additional log( 1ε ) factor in the running time of the algorithm.
In the context of MMS, multiple PTAS algorithms exist for various tasks. Woeginger [1997] provided
a PTAS algorithm for computing (1 − ε)MMSni . This often leads to algorithms for (1, (1 − ε)β)-MMS
approximations of MMS. For example, Garg and Taki [2020], Ghodsi et al. [2018] provide algorithms for
computing (1, 34 − ε)-MMS which run in time poly(m,n, log(
1
ε )). Heinen et al. [2018] demonstrate a PTAS
algorithm for approximating optimal-MMS: (1, (1−ε)λ∗)-MMS. Often, this algorithm is sufficient for finding
MMS allocations (when λ∗ > vi(M)n ). However, this algorithm cannot be used to efficiently determine whether
an MMS allocation exists, and when MMS doesn’t exist, this algorithm may perform arbitrarily poorly with
respect to α (See Theorem 1).
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B Material Omitted from Section 4.2
This section includes all the detailed discussions on constructing tensors S and T , the relevant lemmas, and
the missing proofs.
We begin with the generalized version of Theorem 1. We observe that when d = bn2 c the following
theorem becomes Theorem 1.
Theorem 7. For any n ≥ 4 and any d ≤ bn2 c, there exists an instance with O(dn) goods where any
optimal-MMS allocation guarantees at most dnd e+ 1 agents their MMS value.
Our construction is broken into three components: a tensor S, a tensor T , and d groups of agents. The
entries of tensor S are chosen such that equi-partitions of the entries correspond to a set of slices of S. An
equi-partition is a partition of the entries of a tensor where each set of the partition has the same sum. Here,
all equi-partitions refer to n-partitions. Tensor T provides perturbation so that the only equi-partitions of
S + T are aligned slices.
All tensors in our construction are order d with dimensions (n× n× . . .× n).11 We say that tensor S is
indexed by a d-tuple (x1, . . . , xd) corresponding to entry S[x1, . . . , xd] or Sx1,...,xd for short. The (d−1)-order
slices of tensor S along dimension j are given by Sj(1) to Sj(n) where Sj(i) = {Sx1...xd | xj = i}. We also
define Si;xj=k to be the entry where all indices are i except index xj = k. For example, Si;x1=n = Snii...i.
Tensor addition is entry-wise ((S + T )x1,x2,...,xd = Sx1,x2,...,xd + Tx1,x2,...,xd). Unless otherwise specified, the
entries of a tensor have value 0.
Figure 9a depicts the indexing of an order 3 tensor with dimensions (6× 6× 6). Figure 9b illustrates the
distinct sets of slices of such a tensor. Lastly, Figure 9c depicts the non-zero entries of tensors S and T in
our construction when n = 6 and d = 3.
B.1 Construction of Tensor S
Let S be an order d tensor whose non-zero entries are as follows:
• For 1 ≤ i < n and j ∈ [d], Sii...i = d
n−i−1
dn−i
• For 1 ≤ i < n and j ∈ [d], Si;xj=n = 1d−1 ·
1
dn−i







Lemma 18. Each (d− 1)-order slice Si(j) has sum 1.
Proof. Consider the non-zero entries within slice Sj(i). First when i 6= n, the only non-zero entries of Sj(i)
11When referring to a tensor, the “order” is the number of dimensions that the tensor is embedded in. The “dimensions” of













(9b) The slices of tensor S. (9c) The non-zero entries of S and
T .
Figure 9: The shape and slices of order 3 tensors with dimensions (6× 6× 6).
are Sii...i and Si;xk=n for each k 6= j. Thus:
∑
x∈Sj(i)




























When i = n, the non-zero entries of slice Sj(i) are Snn...n and Sk;xj=n for each k 6= n. Thus:
∑
x∈Sj(n)



















The combinatorial structure of S has a few other desirable properties. First observe that the entries on
the main diagonal (Sii...i) all have value greater than
1
2 . When considering equi-partitions of the entries of
S, these entries must all be included in separate sets. Furthermore, the entries off the main diagonal increase




dn−i are required to account




Lemma 19. The sets of slices {Sj1(1), Sj2(2), . . . , Sjn(n)} are the only equi-partitions equi-partition of the
non-zero entries of S.
Proof. Lemma 18 implies that a set of slices of the form {Sj1(1), Sj2(2), . . . , Sjn(n)} forms an equi-partition.












dn−1 . Importantly, d − 1 of these entries uniquely identify a (d − 1)-order slice Sj1(1) where S1;xj1=n
is the missing entry with value 1d−1 ·
1
dn−1 .
By induction, with a similar argument at each step, each successive entry on the main diagonal must be
included in a set which corresponds exactly to a slice Sji(i).
B.2 Construction of Tensor T
In Lemma 19, the slices of S are not necessarily aligned slices. For example, in the case of three dimensions,
the first slice might be frontal while the second one might be vertical. Since all slices have the same sum,
there is no reason an agent wouldn’t compute MMS by taking slices at random. In order to rectify this, we
construct tensor T so that equi-partitions of S + T correspond only to aligned slices.
Let tensor T be an order d tensor with non-zero values as follows:
• For 1 ≤ i < n− 1, j ∈ [d], Ti;xj=n = −rij
• For 1 ≤ i < n− 1, j ∈ [d], Ti;xj=i+1 = uij
• For j ∈ [d], Tn−1;xj=n = xj
• Tnn...n = z1
Where
• rij = εd(n−1)−di−j+1
• u1j = r1j




+ d−2d−1ui−1,j + rij ≈ rij






It is important to observe that the entries of T are all proportional to powers of a very small ε term.
While some of these values are negative, the negative entries only occur in indices where S has positive value.
Thus if ε is small enough, S + T has only non-negative values. Another important observation is that the
slices of T all have sum 0.
Lemma 20. Each (d− 1)-order slice Tj(i) has sum 0.
Proof. We first address the case of i = 1. Slice Tj(1) contains the non-zero entries T1;xk=n for each k 6= j
and T1;xk=2 for each k 6= j. For each k 6= j, the entry T1;xk=n = −r1j and T1;xk=2 = u1j . Since u1j = −r1j
the sum of these two entries is 0. Adding over all k 6= j yields that the first slice (independent of j) has sum
0.
Now consider slice Tj(i) for 1 < i < n−1. The non-zero entries of T in this slice are Ti;xk=n and Ti;xk=i+1
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((d− 1)(−ui−1,j)) + ui−1,j = 0
The last step follows because each of the (d − 1) summations (for each k 6= j) adds a single −ui−1,j term.
For each k 6= j, (d − 2) of the summations (all but l = k of the (d − 1) inner summations) add a −ui−1,k
term.
We next address the case where i = n− 1. In this case, we observe that i+ 1 = n so the only entries in
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((d− 1)(−un−2,j)) + un−2,j = 0
We last address the case where i = n. In this case, the non-zero entries in this slice are Ti;xj=n for each










(−rkj) + xj + z1
If j = 1 then the term
∑n−2
k=1 (−rkj) + xj = −z1 so this trivially sums to 0. If j 6= 1, then we first
observe that the sum of all entries of T is 0 by adding the sums of the slices {T1(1), T1(2), . . . , T1(n)}. Since∑n
i=1
∑




x∈Tj(k) x = 0, subtracting the two equations gives
∑
x∈Tj(n) = 0.
Combining Lemmas 19 and 20 together immediately shows that any set of aligned slices of (S+T ) forms
an equi-partition of the non-zero entries where each set has sum 1. We now show that these partitions are
unique. For intuition, the key point in our construction is that (d − 1) of the Ti;xj=i+1 terms all lie in the
same slice Tj(i). Once j has been chosen for Tj(1) the extra term T1;xj=2 lies in slice Tj(2).
Lemma 21. The only equi-partitions of the non-zero entries of (S + T ) correspond to aligned slices.
Proof. First observe that if ε is sufficiently small then the structure of Lemma 19 still holds. Consider first the
set of an equi-partition which contains (S+T )11...1. In order for this set to have value 1, it must have (d−1)
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of the entries which receive 1d−1 ·
1
dn−1 value from S. Again, selecting (d− 1) of these uniquely characterizes
a slice (S + T )j(1). Observe that these entries have negative perturbations from T corresponding to −r1k
for each k 6= j. In order for these perturbations to be offset so that the set containing (S + T )11...1 has sum
1, the corresponding entries with values u1k for k 6= j must be included in this set. These entries correspond
exactly to the slice (S + T )j(1).
As in the proof of Lemma 19, we observe that the entries on the main diagonal (S + T )ii...i must be in




dn−i must be included in this set. We address the negative perturbations (from T ) of these entries by
induction. Observe that the smallest perturbations from T occur in the earliest slices ((1, 1) = arg mini,j rij).
Note also that (u1j ,−rij) is the only pair of perturbations from T which are excluded from slice (S+T )j(1).
A similar argument for slice (S+T )j(1) holds for slice (S+T )j(2): in order for the set containing (S+T )22...2
to have value 1, it must also have (d − 1) entries with the −r2k perturbations from T . Since ε2  ε, each
−r2k entry can only be offset with entries with perturbation u2k. (All but one of the smaller perturbation
entries have already been assigned to slice 1.) However, by Lemma 20, we see that adding together all k 6= l
entries of the form −r2k and u2k leaves value u1l (since u1l+
∑d
k 6=l u2k +
∑d
k 6=l−r2k = 0). Observe that only
a single entry of the form u1l is available: notably u1j . Thus the set which contains (S+T )22...2 corresponds
to the slice (S + T )j(2).
By induction on this same argument we see that each set containing the entry (S + T )ii...i for 1 ≤ i < n
must correspond to a slice (S + T )j(i) for some fixed j (after j is chosen for the first slice). We conclude
this proof by observing that the remaining entries all lie in the last slice (S + T )j(n) and have total sum 1
by Lemmas 19 and 20.
With the details of S and T , we are now ready to prove the main theorem. We restate it here for
convenience.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7. For any n ≥ 4 and any d ≤ bn2 c, there exists an instance with O(dn) goods where any
optimal-MMS allocation guarantees at most dnd e+ 1 agents their MMS value.
Proof. Lemma 21 implies that there are d unique equi-partitions of the entries of (S + T ). We group agents
arbitrarily into d groups of size at least 2 and at most dnd e each. We next show how to perturb (S + T )
for each group so that each group has a unique equi-partition. Furthermore, we enforce that the only entry
with positive perturbation for all agents is the last entry on the main diagonal. Let P j be an order d tensor
with non-zero values as follows:
• For 1 ≤ i < n, P ji;xj=n = −ε̃
• P jnn...n = (n− 1)ε̃
The entries where P j is negative correspond to entries where (S+T ) has positive value. Thus (S+T+P j)
has only non-negative entries if ε̃ is sufficiently small. Observe that the slices {(S + T + P j)j(1), (S + T +
P j)j(2), . . . , (S + T + P
j)j(n)} form an equi-partition of the entries of (S + T + P j) as P j has non-zero
values only in the last slice (S + T +P j)j(n) and the total sum of its non-zero entries is 0. If ε̃ is sufficnetly
small (so that the structure of S + T dominates when creating an equi-partition), then none of the other
sets of slices of (S + T +P j) forms an exact equi-partition as every slice except for the last contains exactly
one of the −ε̃ perturbations.
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We now create an instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 where M contains one good for each non-zero entry of (S+T ).
Agents in group j value the goods according to the values of (S + T + P j). Since every agent is able to
form an equi-partition of the entries of their valuation tensor, all agents have MMSi = 1. By allocating
goods according to slices, each agent receives at least (1− ε̃) of their MMS value. Since ε̃ is very small, the
only way all agents can receive at least 1 − ε̃ value is if the goods are allocated according to aligned slices
(Lemma 21). Under this allocation, at most one group and a single additional agent who receives the last
slice (since (S+T +P j)j(n) has positive perturbation (n− 1)ε̃) receive their MMS value. Lastly we observe
that there only O(dn) goods in M .
Again we note that if d = bn2 c in the above theorem, then we see that only 3 agents (4 if n is odd) receive
their full MMS in any optimal-MMS allocation.
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r ` s
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8
g9
b2n3 c
g9 g10 g11 g12 g13 g14 g15 g16 g17
Figure 13: The low-value goods g9 to g17 use a moving-knife procedure to be added to bundles initialized with a
single high-value good (g1 to g8 each. Thus h = 8). The bag-filling algorithm fills r bundles with ` left to fill when
it runs out of low-value goods. The remaining value is tied up with the surplus s high-value goods.
C Material Omitted from Section 4.5
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. ( 23 , 1)-MMS exists and can be computed in polynomial time with an oracle for MMS.
Given the previous lemma, we now show that Algorithm 4.7 can guarantee MMS 231. We first order and
scale the instance so that MMSi = 1 for all agents. This implies that vi(M) ≥ n. Using the {g1} and
{gn, gn+1} reduction, we may assume no good has value more than 1, there are at most n high-value goods,
and no good has value more than 1. We define a good to be high-value if any agent values it at least 12 . A
good is low-value otherwise. Let H be the set of h high-value goods.
We begin by letting each agent form preview bundles by running the bag-filling procedure assuming all
agents’ preferences are identical to their own. Since goods are added to bundles in the same order when
agents form preview bundles as in bag-filling, these bundles form the worst case for bag-filling. With this
intuition, we first show that each agent is able to form at least b 2n3 c − s preview bundles worth at least 1
and at most 32 .
Lemma 22. Given a fixed set H, each agent can create at least b 2n3 c − s preview bundles worth at least 1
and at most 32 using bag-filling.
Proof. Suppose that agent i’s preview bag-filling procedure stopped before b 2n3 c bundles were filled. We
consider cases based on the number of surplus high-value goods s = max(h − b 2n3 c, 0) and the number of
bundles that were filled r. Define the number of bundles left to be filled as ` = b 2n3 c − r. Figure 13 depicts
an example stopping point of bag-filling with the values of r, `, h, and s respectively.














1. If h ≤ b 2n3 c then we claim that b
2n
3 c bundles were filled during bag-filling. In this case, the total






2 value remaining. If vi(gr+1) +
1
2 < 1, then the total value from low-value goods is at
least 32`−
1
2` ≥ ` > 1 which implies another bundle can still be filled.
2. Suppose that ` > s. We first show that in this case the allocated high-value goods must each be valued
at least 34 . Suppose for contradiction that vi(gr+1) ≤
3
4 . Since the instance is ordered and we add
high-value goods to bundles in descending order, all remaining high-value goods have value at most 34 .











4 (` − s) ≥
3
4 . The last step follows because ` and s are both integers so ` > s implies
` ≥ s + 1. If gr+1 together with the remaining low-value goods has value at least 1 (enough to fill a
bundle) then we arrive at our contradiction that bag-filling had stopped without allocating these goods.
If gr+1 with the remaining low-value goods does not fill another bundle then vi(gr+1) <
1
4 implying
that the total remaining value from low-value goods is at least 32` −
1




4 (2`) ≥ ` ≥ 1.
This implies that another bundle could be filled, again contradicting that bag-filling stopped. We may
now assume that if ` > s then vi(gr+1) ≥ 34 for agent i. Since the instance is ordered, this in turn
implies that each of the first r high-value goods also had value at least 34 .
During bag-filling, if a single low-value good is allocated to a bundle, then that bundle has at most 12
value from low-value goods. However, if multiple low-value goods are added to a bundle, then since
low-value goods are added in descending order, the last good has value no more than the second last
good. Since the second last good was not enough to fill the bundle, then the total value from the last
two low-value goods is no more than twice the value needed to fill the bundle before the last two goods
were added. Accordingly, this implies that the total value from low-value goods allocated to a bundle
is no more than twice the value of 1 − vi(gk) where gk is the initial high-value good in the bundle.
Since all bundles allocated during bag-filling contained a high-value good worth at least 34 , this implies
that the total value of low-value goods allocated to any bundle is at most 12 whether a single low-value
good or multiple low-value goods were needed.
Observe that because bags are initialized with high-value goods in descending order, and low-value
goods are added to a bundles in descending order, that if ever a single bundle requires multiple low-
value goods then each subsequent bundle will also require multiple low-value goods. Likewise, if some
bundle requires only a single low-value good, then each bundle allocated before it must also have had
only a single low-value good.
We now consider an MMS partition A = (A1, . . . An) for agent i. Suppose first that there is no bundle
in M which contains multiple high-value goods, and suppose without loss of generality that the bundles
are sorted such that g1 is in bundle A1 and gh is in Ah. Thus there are at least n − h bundles which
contain only low-value goods. These bundles can be separated during bag-filling to fill at least 2(n−h)
bundles since each bundle filled during bag-filling needed at most 12 value from low-value goods. We
also observe that the low-value goods from bundles Ar+1 to Ah can be paired together to form at
least s sets of low-value goods which value at least twice 1 − vi(gr+1) each (observe that since ` > s,
b s+`2 c ≥ s). Thus if at least two low-value goods are needed to fill any bundle after the first 2(n− h)
bundles, then we can fill an additional s bundles using the value from these low-value bundles. In total
we are able to fill at least 2(n− h) + s bundles implying that r ≥ 2(n− h) + s. By definition of r and
h this implies that b 2n3 c− ` ≥ 2n− 2(b
2n
3 c+ s) + s, implying that s ≥ `+ 2n− 3b
2n
3 c ≥ ` contradicting
the assumption that ` > s.
A challenge arises if bundles after the first 2(n − h) still require only a single low-value good. It is
possible that these goods are valued more than 2(1 − vi(gr+1)) and thus prevent us from using our
previous argument. Importantly, we may set a threshold that a bundle requires only a single low-value
good if the low-value good is worth at least (1− vi(gr+1)). We observe that any such items had to go
into some bundle of the MMS partition A. Consider a low value good g which filled a bundle on its
own. If g ∈ Aj where j ≤ r then we are fine because we previously were not counting any of the value
from low-value goods within these bundles. If g ∈ Aj where r < j ≤ h then we modify our pairing
argument (from the proceeding paragraph) to exclude bundle Aj and pair the remaining bundles.
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Suppose that there are k such bundles from Ar+1 to Ah which contain a good worth more than
(1 − vi(gr+1)). Then we may form k + b 2s−k2 c ≥ k + (s − k) = s bundles during bag-filling using
the modified pairing argument. Lastly, if g ∈ Aj for j > h, we must be careful to prevent double
counting the value from these bundles. If Aj contains two or more low-value goods with value at least
(1− vi(gr+1) then we may safely assume that we fill 2 bundles during bag-filling while still attributing
the value from g to Aj . However, if Aj contains less than 2 low-value goods worth at least (1−vi(gr+1))
then we observe that g is the only such good in Aj . In this case, we may swap a subset of low-value
goods worth between 14 and
1
2 with some low-value good worth at least 1− vi(gr+1) from the bundles
Ar+1 to Ah. Observe that such a subset of goods must exist as there is at least
1
2 value from low-
value goods not worth at least 2(1 − vi(gr+1)). If none of these goods are worth more than 14 then
a combination of them must be worth between 14 and
1
2 . After performing these swaps we may still
assume that each bundle from Ah+1 to An has at least enough value to fill 2 bundles during bag-filling.
Any extra low-value goods worth at least (1 − vi(gr+1)) are now accounted for either because they
are in bundles A1 to Ar, because we can use the modified pairing argument, or because they fall in a
bundle of Ah+1 to An which contains more than 2 such goods. In total, we now see that agent i is able
to fill at least 2(n − h) + s bundles during bag-filling. With the same argument as before, this yields
the contradiction that ` > s.
We lastly observe that the assumption that A contains no bundle with two high-value goods can be
removed as each such bundle causes another bundles of A to have no high-value goods (by pigeonhole
principle). In total we are able to fill two more bundles using the low-value goods for each of these
additional bundles of A which contain no high-value goods. Simultaneously we may lose at most one
bundle from the range Ar+1 to Ah that we can use for the pairing argument. This net change only
increases the number of bundles we may fill during bag-filling. Thus we conclude with the contradiction
that ` > s in all cases which implies that bag-filling never stops when s > `.
We now observe that agent i’s preview bundles are a pessimistic preview of bag-filling. Let Bi =
(Bi1, . . . , B
i
b 2n3 c
) be the set of preview bundles for agent i, and A1 to Ar be the bundles allocated by bag-
filling (lines 10-12 of Algorithm 4.7).
Lemma 23. For any agent i ∈ N who has not yet received a bundle, the set of goods allocated in the first
k bundles of bag-filling is a subset of that agent’s first k preview bundles. Formally, for each k from 1 to r,
∪kj=1Aj ⊆ ∪kj=1Bij.
Proof. Consider for induction the base case of k = 1. Since goods are allocated in the same order as they
were during preview bundles, each agent would request the first bundle at the same time as they requested
their first preview bundle. The agent with the smallest cardinality first bundle will request it before any
other agent. Thus for each agent i ∈ N , A1 ⊆ Bi1.
Suppose for induction that each agent i ∈ N who has not yet received a bundle believes that ∪k−1j=1Aj ⊆
∪k−1j=1Bij . Since the high-value goods are added to successive bundles in descending order, the high value
good in Bik will be the same high-value good as in Ak, namely gk. Consider the set of low-value goods in B
i
k.










we observe that these low-value goods have value at least as much as the low value goods in Bik and thus
will be added to Ak before any low-value good of B
i
k. Thus either another agent will request Ak before the
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last low-value good of Bik is added to Ak or agent i will request bundle Ak after the last low-value good of
Bik has been added to Ak. As a result, either agent i will be allocated a bundle and thus be removed from
the set of agents still without a bundle or ∪kj=1Aj ⊆ ∪kj=1Bij .
We note that the worst case (which leads to the most competition) in the previous lemma is when all
agents have identical preferences. However, in this case, MMS necessarily exists. We now show how to
combine Lemma 22 and Lemma 23 to prove that MMS 231 exists.
Theorem 3. ( 23 , 1)-MMS exists and can be computed in polynomial time with an oracle for MMS.
Proof. Because of Lemma 3, we only focus on ordered instances. If we run the bag-filling algorithm, Lemma
23 implies that at each step, the set of available goods includes the set of available goods as each agent had
when they form preview bundles. Thus Lemma 22 still applies as the arguments in each case still hold.
After bag-filling terminates it must be the case that s ≥ `. Since there exists at least one agent who
values gh at least
1
2 by definition, we may give that agent the bundle {gr+1, gh}. Any agent who does not
believe that gh is worth at least
1
2 will believe that the allocated bundle has value at most
3
2 . Since s ≥ `,
we see that b s+`2 c ≥ `. Thus, if we can repeat this process at least ` times by allocating the first and last
high-value goods together, then we will be able to satisfy b 2n3 c bundles in total. However, suppose that after
k steps, no remaining agent believes that {gr+k, gh−k} is worth at least 1. In this case, we may truncate
the pool of high-value items by redefining some items to be low-value. At this point, the assumption that
low-value goods are allocated in descending order will be violated, which may break the analysis of case 2 of
Lemma 22 if we resume bag-filling. In order to fix this, we instead perform another iteration of bag-filling,
keeping fixed only the bundles allocated by pairing high-value goods. The analysis of Lemma 22 will now
hold as any bundle allocated with a single low-value good in this step had at most 12 value from low-value
goods to the remaining agents. Because the set of high-value goods strictly decreases in size whenever we
repeat this step, the algorithm will eventually terminate with an allocation that satisfies MMS 231 on the
ordered instance.
We observe that under the assumption that ki = MMSi for each agent, Algorithm 4.7 finds a MMS
2
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allocation. While this assumption is not polynomial, the rest of Algorithm 4.7 runs in polynomial time.
Thus a MMS 231 allocation can be computed in polynomial time with an oracle for MMS values.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. For n < 9, Algorithm 4.7 computes a ( 23 , 1)-MMS allocation in polynomial time.
Proof. We follow the steps of Algorithm 4.7; however, we scale the instance so that MMSi = 1. By Lemma 5,
we can apply valid reductions and guarantee that any agent allocated a bundle during these steps receives
value at least vi(Ai) ≥ 1 ≥ MMSni . We next observe that by Lemma 3, unordering an allocation results in
an allocation for the original instance where every agent receives at least as much value as in the ordered
allocation. Therefore, we focus on ordered instances where no valid reduction is possible; that is, vi(g1) < 1,
vi({gn, gn+1}) < 1, and vi(M) = n. Observe that because vi(gn) ≥ vi(gn+1) and vi({gn, gn+1}) < 1,
vi(gn+1) <
1
2 . Thus there are at most n high-value goods.
Since the instance is ordered, relabeling the goods on line 7 and initializing bag B to contain the good
g1 on line 9 guarantees that each time a bag is allocated, it contains at most one high-value good. This
initialized bag cannot be allocated on its own because vi(g1) < 1 for all i ∈ N ′. Each good added to B from
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L on line 11 has value less than 12 to all agent. Likewise, vi(B) < 1 for all agents before the last good is
added to B. Thus any bundle allocated on line 12 has value at most 32 to all agents still in the market.
The bag-filling steps on lines 11 and 12 will continue to while there are sufficiently many low value goods
to fill a bundle (this is checked on line 10). Suppose bag-filling stops after allocating r = b 2n3 c − ` bundles.
Let agent i be an agent in N ′ with the maximum number of high-value goods. Since the instance is ordered,
this means that agent i values g1 to gh at least
1
2 . Under the original labeling of the goods at line 5, the first
r items have been allocated in separate bags.
If ` ≤ 0, then the algorithm will terminate on line 18 resulting in an MMS231 allocation. Suppose ` > 0
Since agent i values the allocated bundles at no more than 32 , agent i must value the remaining unallocated
goods least n− 32 (b
2n









If h < b 2n3 c, then there are at most ` unallocated high-value goods each of value at most 1. Thus the
remaining low-value goods have total value at least `2 . If gr+1 ∈ H then agent i values gr+1 and the remaining
low-value goods at least 1. If gr+1 ∈ L, then the remaining 3`2 value is contained in low-value goods. Thus a
subset of these goods can be allocated to agent i. In either case, allocating a bundle to agent i contradicts
that bag-filling stopped. Consider the following cases which depend on h, s, and `.
1. Suppose ` ≥ 2s. Since the instance is ordered, the remaining (h− r) high-value goods all have value at
most vi(gr+1). For agent i, the remaining low-value goods have value at least
3
2` − vi(gr+1)(h − r) =
3






2`(1− vi(gr+1)) ≥ 1− vi(gr+1). Thus agent i values gr+1
together with the remaining low-value goods at least 1. This contradicts that bag-filling stopped before
agent i received a bundle.
2. Suppose ` ≤ s. In this case, we observe that some agent in the market has high-value for the first and
last high-value goods g1 and gh (after relabeling the goods on line 7). As in the proof of Theorem 3,
all agents who agrees with this has at 2` goods that they value at least 12 . Any agent who does not
value {g1, gh} at least 1 may consider gh as a low-value good in later iterations of bag-filling. We
observe that if the set of high-value goods does not change (because some other agent values gh−1 at
least 12 ) after undoing temporary allocations on line 17, then the set of allocated bundles in the next
iteration of bag-filling will be identical to those allocated in the current round. While this may slow
down the bag-filling procedure practically, it does not add more than a polynomial amount of work to
the algorithm.
3. The remaining cases arise when s < ` < 2s. We enumerate each case to show that they do not occur
when n < 9. We consider cases as a tuple of the form (n, s, `) for clarity. Since n < 9, and s < ` < 2s,
there are 7 cases.
The cases (5, 2, 3), (7, 3, 4), and (8, 3, 5) assume that no bundles are allocated during bag-filling. How-
ever, combining the facts that vi(g) ≤ vi(g1) < 1, there are at most n high-value goods, and vi(M) = n,
there must be at least n− n(vi(g1)) ≥ n(1− vi(g1)) ≥ 1− vi(g1) value from low-value goods. Thus at
least one bundle is allocated during bag-filling and these cases do not occur.
The cases (6, 2, 3) and (8, 3, 4) only occur if some remaining agent i believes there are n high-value
goods. Since vi({gn, gn+1}) < 1 all low value goods are worth less than 1 − vi(gn). If {g1, gn+1} is
worth value 1 to some agent, then the first bundle allocated was {g1, gn+1}. In this case, the amount
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of value remaining from low-value goods is at least:
















> (1− vi(g2)) + (n− 2)− (n− 2)
> 1− vi(g2)
If {g1, gn+1} is not worth 1 to any agent, then because low-value goods are added in descending order,
the maximum value from low-value goods allocated in the first bundle is 2(1− vi(g1)). Thus the value


















≥ (1− vi(g2)) + (n− 3)− (n− 3)
= 1− vi(g2)
In either case, there is at least enough value from low-value goods to fill another bundle during bag-
filling contradicting that bag-filling stopped. Thus the cases (6, 2, 3) and (8, 3, 4) do not occur.
The remaining two cases are (7, 2, 3) and (8, 2, 3). In these cases, there are n− 1 high-value goods. We















> 1 + (1− vi(g1)) + (1− vi(g2)) + (1− vi(g3))




− vi(g1)) + (
3
2
− vi(g2)) + (1− vi(g3))
Since the first two bundles have total value at most 32 , there is at least enough value to fill the first two
bundles and still have enough low-value goods to fill a third bundle. This contradicts that only one or
two bundles were filled during bag-filling (based on the cases). Thus neither cases (7, 2, 3) nor (8, 2, 3)
occur.
55
D Optimal-MMS Fails for Chores
We begin with the generalized version of Theorem 5. We observe that when d = bn2 c the following theorem
becomes Theorem 1.
Theorem 8. For any n ≥ 4 and any d ≤ bn2 c, there exists an instance with O(dn) chores where any
optimal-MMS allocation guarantees at most dnd e+ 1 agents their MMS value.
Our construction is broken into three components: a tensor S, a tensor T , and d groups of agents. The
entries of tensor S are chosen such that equi-partitions of the entries correspond to a set of slices of S. An
equi-partition is a partition of the entries of a tensor where each set of the partition has the same sum. Here,
all equi-partitions refer to n-partitions. Tensor T provides perturbation so that the only equi-partitions of
S + T are aligned slices.
All tensors in our construction are order d with dimensions (n× n× . . .× n).12 We say that tensor S is
indexed by a d-tuple (x1, . . . , xd) corresponding to entry S[x1, . . . , xd] or Sx1,...,xd for short. The (d−1)-order
slices of tensor S along dimension j are given by Sj(1) to Sj(n) where Sj(i) = {Sx1...xd | xj = i}. We also
define Si;xj=k to be the entry where all indices are i except index xj = k. For example, Si;x1=n = Snii...i.
Tensor addition is entry-wise ((S + T )x1,x2,...,xd = Sx1,x2,...,xd + Tx1,x2,...,xd). Unless otherwise specified, the
entries of a tensor have value 0.
Figure 9a depicts the indexing of an order 3 tensor with dimensions (6× 6× 6). Figure 9b illustrates the
distinct sets of slices of such a tensor. Lastly, Figure 9c depicts the non-zero entries of tensors S and T in
our construction when n = 6 and d = 3.
Construction of Tensor S. Let S be an order d tensor whose non-zero entries are as follows:
• For 1 ≤ i < n and j ∈ [d], Sii...i = −d
n−i−1
dn−i
• For 1 ≤ i < n and j ∈ [d], Si;xj=n = − 1d−1 ·
1
dn−i







Lemma 24. Each (d− 1)-order slice Si(j) has sum −1.
Proof. Consider the non-zero entries within slice Sj(i). First when i 6= n, the only non-zero entries of Sj(i)
are Sii...i and Si;xk=n for each k 6= j. Thus:
∑
x∈Sj(i)
































12When referring to a tensor, the “order” is the number of dimensions that the tensor is embedded in. The “dimensions” of
a tensor, however, refers to the number of entries along each axis, similar to the dimensions of a matrix.
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When i = n, the non-zero entries of slice Sj(i) are Snn...n and Sk;xj=n for each k 6= n. Thus:
∑
x∈Sj(n)






















The combinatorial structure of S has a few other desirable properties. First observe that the entries on
the main diagonal (Sii...i) all have value less than − 12 . When considering equi-partitions of the entries of S,
these entries must all be included in separate sets. Furthermore, the entries off the main diagonal increase
when approaching Snn...n in such a way that all d of the entries with value − 1d−1 ·
1
dn−i are required to




Lemma 25. The sets of slices {Sj1(1), Sj2(2), . . . , Sjn(n)} are the only equi-partitions equi-partition of the
non-zero entries of S.
Proof. Lemma 24 implies that a set of slices of the form {Sj1(1), Sj2(2), . . . , Sjn(n)} forms an equi-partition.
In order to show that these equi-partitions are unique, consider the set which contains S11...1. Since −1 +




dn−2 . Thus the only entries which can be included with S11...1 are of the form
− 1d−1 ·
1
dn−1 . Importantly, d− 1 of these entries uniquely identify a (d− 1)-order slice Sj1(1) where S1;xj1=n
is the missing entry with value − 1d−1 ·
1
dn−1 .
By induction, with a similar argument at each step, each successive entry on the main diagonal must be
included in a set which corresponds exactly to a slice Sji(i).
Construction of Tensor T . In Lemma 25, the slices of S are not necessarily aligned slices. For example,
in the case of three dimensions, the first slice might be frontal while the second one might be vertical. Since
all slices have the same sum, there is no reason an agent wouldn’t compute MMS by taking slices at random.
In order to rectify this, we construct tensor T so that equi-partitions of S + T correspond only to aligned
slices.
Let tensor T be an order d tensor with non-zero values as follows:
• For 1 ≤ i < n− 1, j ∈ [d], Ti;xj=n = rij
• For 1 ≤ i < n− 1, j ∈ [d], Ti;xj=i+1 = −uij
• For j ∈ [d], Tn−1;xj=n = −xj
• Tnn...n = −z1
Where
• rij = εd(n−1)−di−j+1
• u1j = r1j




+ d−2d−1ui−1,j + rij ≈ rij






It is important to observe that the entries of T are all proportional to powers of a very small ε term.
While some of these values are positive, the positive entries only occur in indices where S has negative value.
Thus if ε is small enough, S + T has only non-positive values. Another important observation is that the
slices of T all have sum 0.
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Lemma 26. Each (d− 1)-order slice Tj(i) has sum 0.
Proof. We first address the case of i = 1. Slice Tj(1) contains the non-zero entries T1;xk=n for each k 6= j
and T1;xk=2 for each k 6= j. For each k 6= j, the entry T1;xk=n = r1j and T1;xk=2 = −u1j . Since −u1j = r1j
the sum of these two entries is 0. Adding over all k 6= j yields that the first slice (independent of j) has sum
0.
Now consider slice Tj(i) for 1 < i < n−1. The non-zero entries of T in this slice are Ti;xk=n and Ti;xk=i+1













































































((d− 1)(ui−1,j))− ui−1,j = 0
The last step follows because each of the (d− 1) summations (for each k 6= j) adds a single ui−1,j term. For
each k 6= j, (d− 2) of the summations (all but l = k of the (d− 1) inner summations) add a ui−1,k term.
We next address the case where i = n− 1. In this case, we observe that i+ 1 = n so the only entries in
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((d− 1)(un−2,j))− un−2,j = 0
We last address the case where i = n. In this case, the non-zero entries in this slice are Ti;xj=n for each













− xj − z1
If j = 1 then the term
∑n−2
k=1 (rkj) − xj = z1 so this trivially sums to 0. If j 6= 1, then we first observe
that the sum of all entries of T is 0 by adding the sums of the slices {T1(1), T1(2), . . . , T1(n)}. Since∑n
i=1
∑




x∈Tj(k) x = 0, subtracting the two equations gives
∑
x∈Tj(n) = 0.
Combining Lemmas 25 and 26 together immediately shows that any set of aligned slices of (S+T ) forms
an equi-partition of the non-zero entries where each set has sum −1. We now show that these partitions are
unique. For intuition, the key point in our construction is that (d − 1) of the Ti;xj=i+1 terms all lie in the
same slice Tj(i). Once j has been chosen for Tj(1) the extra term T1;xj=2 lies in slice Tj(2).
Lemma 27. The only equi-partitions of the non-zero entries of (S + T ) correspond to aligned slices.
Proof. First observe that if ε is sufficiently small then the structure of Lemma 25 still holds. Consider first
the set of an equi-partition which contains (S + T )11...1. In order for this set to have value −1, it must have
(d − 1) of the entries which receive − 1d−1 ·
1
dn−1 value from S. Again, selecting (d − 1) of these uniquely
characterizes a slice (S+T )j(1). Observe that these entries have positive perturbations from T corresponding
to r1k for each k 6= j. In order for these perturbations to be offset so that the set containing (S+T )11...1 has
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sum −1, the corresponding entries with values −u1k for k 6= j must be included in this set. These entries
correspond exactly to the slice (S + T )j(1).
As in the proof of Lemma 25, we observe that the entries on the main diagonal (S + T )ii...i must
be in separate sets. Likewise, because ε is small, a similar argument enforces that (d − 1) of the entries
with value − 1d−1 ·
1
dn−i must be included in this set. We address the positive perturbations (from T ) of
these entries by induction. Observe that the smallest perturbations from T occur in the earliest slices
((1, 1) = arg maxi,j −rij). Note also that (−u1j , rij) is the only pair of perturbations from T which are
excluded from slice (S + T )j(1). A similar argument for slice (S + T )j(1) holds for slice (S + T )j(2): in
order for the set containing (S + T )22...2 to have value −1, it must also have (d − 1) entries with the r2k
perturbations from T . Since ε2  ε, each r2k entry can only be offset with entries with perturbation
−u2k. (All but one of the smaller perturbation entries have already been assigned to slice 1.) However, by





k 6=l r2k = 0). Observe that only a single entry of the form −u1l is available: notably
−u1j . Thus the set which contains (S + T )22...2 corresponds to the slice (S + T )j(2).
By induction on this same argument we see that each set containing the entry (S + T )ii...i for 1 ≤ i < n
must correspond to a slice (S+T )j(i) for some fixed j (after j is chosen for the first slice). We conclude this
proof by observing that the remaining entries all lie in the last slice (S + T )j(n) and have total sum −1 by
Lemmas 25 and 26.
With the details of S and T , we are now ready to prove the main theorem. We restate it here for
convenience.
Theorem 8. For any n ≥ 4 and any d ≤ bn2 c, there exists an instance with O(dn) chores where any
optimal-MMS allocation guarantees at most dnd e+ 1 agents their MMS value.
Proof. Lemma 27 implies that there are d unique equi-partitions of the entries of (S + T ). We group agents
arbitrarily into d groups of size at least 2 and at most dnd e each. We next show how to perturb (S + T )
for each group so that each group has a unique equi-partition. Furthermore, we enforce that the only entry
with positive perturbation for all agents is the last entry on the main diagonal. Let P j be an order d tensor
with non-zero values as follows:
• For 1 ≤ i < n, P ji;xj=n = −ε̃
• P jnn...n = (n− 1)ε̃
The entry where P j is positive correspond to entries where (S+T ) has negative value. Thus (S+T +P j)
has only non-positive entries if ε̃ is sufficiently small. Observe that the slices {(S + T + P j)j(1), (S + T +
P j)j(2), . . . , (S + T + P
j)j(n)} form an equi-partition of the entries of (S + T + P j) as P j has non-zero
values only in the last slice (S+T +P j)j(n) and the total sum of its non-zero entries is 0. If ε̃ is sufficiently
small (so that the structure of S + T dominates when creating an equi-partition), then none of the other
sets of slices of (S + T +P j) forms an exact equi-partition as every slice except for the last contains exactly
one of the −ε̃ perturbations.
We now create an instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 where M contains one good for each non-zero entry of (S+T ).
Agents in group j value the goods according to the values of (S+T +P j). Since every agent is able to form
an equi-partition of the entries of their valuation tensor, all agents have MMSi = −1. By allocating goods
according to slices, each agent receives (−1 − ε̃) value which implies the optimal-MMS constant is at most
(−1 − ε̃). Since ε̃ is very small, the only way all agents can receive at most −1 − ε̃ value is if the chores
are allocated according to aligned slices (Lemma 27). Under this allocation, at most one group and a single
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additional agent who receives the last slice (since (S+T +P j)j(n) has positive perturbation (n−1)ε̃) receive
their MMS value. Lastly we observe that there only O(dn) goods in M .
Again we note that if d = bn2 c in the above theorem, then we see that only 3 agents (4 if n is odd) receive
their full MMS in any optimal-MMS allocation.
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